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ABSTRACT

Zhang, Na. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2015. Essays on Nudging
Customers’ Behaviors: Evidence from Online Grocery Shopping and Crowdfunding.
Major Professors: Karthik Kannan and J. George Shanthikumar

The dissertation consists of three essays that employ predictive analytics,
structural modeling techniques and field experiments to understand and nudge customers’
behaviors in two types of online engagement platforms. The first one is customers’
purchase behaviors in an online grocery store and the other is customer’ contribution
behaviors in a reward-based crowdfunding platform. In both contexts, we study how to
actively nudge their behaviors. In Chapter 2, we investigates how, when dealing with
products that are available in limited quantities, customers may be nudged to purchase
them. Specifically, our main problem is to identify targeted customers to receive the
limited number of coupons. We develop a Support Vector Machines (SVM) based
approach to rank order customers. We conduct a field experiment in an online grocery
store to evaluate how well the identified customers are nudged through information
and/or couponing. We find that, in terms of the successful nudges, our SVM-based
approach performed better than other approaches.
We are not just focusing on nudging customers to purchase but also on nudging
them to contribute. In Chapter 3, we examine how to leverage the project reward
structure (PRS) to nudge backers to contribute on reward-based crowdfunding platforms.

xii
We develop a structural model of the backer’s dynamic pledging and learning behaviors.
We use it to test a variety of behavioral theories of how PRS and intertemporal
changes in the PRS influence backers’ pledging decisions over the course of a project’s
funding period. We also use the model to run market simulations and shed lights on how
to offer the PRS changes and what is the optimal timing to make such changes.
Coupons often act as price discrimination tools to nudge low willingness-to-pay
customers to purchase. However, in our context where there is limited product
availability, strategies other than just sending coupons may be desirable. For some
customers, it is sufficient that we provide information alone but no coupons. Also
coupons of different discount depths might play a different role as customers might
update their expectations. Particularly, in Chapter 4, we investigate the impact of
different nudging strategies on customers’ purchase behaviors. We evaluate the
effectiveness of those different nudging strategies via a randomized field experiment.
Consistent with the prior literature, we found coupons could serve as a form of
“advertisement”. Furthermore, our findings show that coupons with a low discount rate
could have a longer information carryover effect than those with a higher discount one.
The experiment also generated insights about when couponing as opposed to information
is more effective when nudging.

1

CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

With the increasing importance of big data and business analytics in the business
area and predictive analytics in the academic world (Shmueli & Koppius 2011), our
research pays close attention to leveraging vast amount of data to learn and predict
customers’ online behavior, provide insights to business managers and contribute to
academic research as well. Much of the information systems and operation management
literature appears to treat the end-customer demand to be exogenous (Bernstein and
Federgruen, 2005; Cachon and Lariviere, 2005). However, there are many real world
examples in which customers’ demand can be nudged using information technology.
Zara is an example of a firm where consumer demand is nudged by limiting production
even if it meant leaving demand unsatisfied (Ghemawat and Nueno, 2003). Shaping the
consumer demand is more easily accomplished in the Internet channel given the store’s
ability to adapt the offering as well as track individual consumers’ behavior. In this
dissertation, we explore different ways and strategies that companies could employ to
nudge customers’ behaviors in two types of online engagement platforms, such as an
online grocery store and a reward-based crowdfunding platform.
In Chapter 2, we investigates how, when dealing with products that are available
in limited quantities but still exceeds the current demand, customers may be nudged to
purchase them. Specifically, our main problem is to identify targeted customers to
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receive the limited number of coupons. This implies that we have to be able to rank order
customers based on their purchase potential, an issue that is non-existent in most
recommendation systems. We develop a Support Vector Machines (SVM) based
approach to rank order customers. The underlying notion is that Type I errors in our
classifier are not necessarily problematic but are potential nudging targets. Also, as a
consequence, traditional ways of evaluating classifiers (with Type I and Type II errors)
are not appropriate. Therefore, we conduct a field experiment to evaluate how well the
identified customers are nudged through information and/or couponing. We find that, in
terms of the successful nudges, our SVM-based approach performed better than other
approaches.
We are not just focusing on nudging customers to purchase but also on nudging
them to contribute, such as on reward-based crowdfunding platforms. In Chapter 3, we
collect data from Kickstarter, a funding platform for creative projects, and examine how
to leverage the project reward structure (PRS) to nudge consumers to contribute. Our
preliminary analysis reveals that PRS does matter in determining the success of the
projects. Furthermore, we have developed a structural model of the backer’s dynamic
pledging decision and learning behaviors. We use it to test a variety of behavioral
theories of how PRS and intertemporal changes in the PRS influence backers’ pledging
decisions over the course of a project’s funding period. Furthermore, we also use the
model to run additional market simulations and shed lights on how to offer the PRS
changes over the course of the funding period and what is the optimal timing to make
such changes.
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Coupons often act as price discrimination tools to nudge low willingness-to-pay
customers to purchase. However, in our context where there is limited product
availability, strategies other than just sending coupons may be desirable. For some
customers, it is sufficient that we provide information alone but no coupons. Also, when
a coupon is provided, customers may perceive the product to be unpopular and therefore
may anchor their valuations for the product lower. Coupons of different discount depths
might play a different role when the anchoring effects are considered. So it is valuable to
understand the effects of coupons versus information on nudging customers to purchase
the product. Particularly, in Chapter 4, we investigate the impact of different nudging
strategies, such as information only, low discount, high discount, on customers’ purchase
behaviors. We evaluate the effectiveness of those different nudging strategies via a
randomized field experiment. Consistent with the prior literature, we found coupons
could serve as a form of “advertisement”. Furthermore, our findings show that coupons
with a low discount rate could have a longer information carryover effect than those with
a higher discount one. Furthermore, the experiment also generated insights about when
couponing as opposed to information is more effective when nudging different types of
customers.
Our research is of great significance to both academic research and industry
practice. Our work contributes to the literature of predictive analytics, machine learning,
recommender systems, email targeting, crowdfunding and consumer behaviors in
different online contexts. Meanwhile, we offer useful big data analytics tools for
managers to identify targeted customers for products with limited availability. Also we
offer insights regarding the type of customers to target with information and coupons.
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Moreover, we provide guidelines to entrepreneurs about leveraging the project reward
structure to nudge backers to contribute on crowdfunding platforms. Our work also
provide new paths for groundbreaking research in the future.
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CHAPTER 2.
A RECOMMENDER SYSTEM TO NUDGE
CUSTOMERS IN A CAPACITY CONSTRAINED SUPPLY
CHAIN

2.1

Introduction

Traditional models in the supply chain literature (e.g., Bernstein and Federgruen,
2005, Cachon and Lariviere, 2005) have treated the end-customer demand to be
exogenous. However, allowing for shaping customer behavior gives the firm another
degree of freedom to improve its supply chain efficiency. For example, Zara offers
products only over a limited duration, creating a sense of urgency amongst its customers.
This urgency implicitly goads the customer to purchase the products immediately. Zara
takes advantage of this shaped behavior and has built its supply chain to benefit from it
(Petro, 2013). Internet technologies and availability of plethora of data enables firms to
more effectively shape customers. Perhaps, because of that motivation, many firms have
brought in-house the order fulfillment of their electronic channels, which they had
originally outsourced (Duhigg 2012). In this paper, we investigate one possible way of
firms nudging customers by taking into account the supply chain constraints.
We develop a recommendation system that takes into account product availability
constraints, implement it in an online grocery store context, and evaluate the
implementation. The grocery firm we work with acts as an intermediary between local
farms, food partners, and customers. The motivation for the recommendation system is
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that the firm faces availability constraints for some of its products (because they are
sourced from small farms) but the available quantities still exceed the current demand.
Therefore, the firm has the motivation to identify the targeted customers for the unused
though limited supply, instead of simply blanketing all customers with coupons. Our
objective is to promote limited quantities of a high-margin product in the presence of
limited availability. For this purpose, we develop an SVM-based approach. Our technique
is different from those in typical existing recommendation systems such as content-based
filtering and collaborative filtering because the feature set in the grocery context is not as
comprehensive as in other contexts (for details about the differences, see Section 2.2).
Our main objective with the proposed technique is to identify a subset of Type I error
records that can potentially be nudged and evaluate the strength of identification using an
experiment.
There are two ways in which we conduct the evaluations. First, we compare the
SVM-based approach against other standard techniques such as logit regression, and kNearest Neighbors (kNN) using the historical dataset. We split the historical data into
training and testing periods on a rolling time window. After training, we analyze how
well the predictions are about customers’ future purchasing habits, and we find the SVMbased approach to perform better. Since evaluations based only on the historical data
cannot measure the effectiveness of nudging, we also conduct a field experiment, which
becomes the second manner of evaluation. In the experiment, subjects are nudged using a)
information only; b) low discount; or c) high discounts. We study the impact of the
different forms of nudging strategies on the nudging outcomes.
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In short, we believe that our work provides both academic rigor and practical
relevance. We contribute to the literature on supply chain, predictive analytics, and
recommender systems. To the best of our knowledge, none of the prior works have
considered a recommendation system that considers the supply chain constraints. We
develop and demonstrate the effectiveness of the recommendation system through a
combination of analysis and experiment. The analysis of data from our experiment also
provides useful managerial insights.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the
related literature. Section 2.3 presents our SVM-based approach. In Section 2.4, we
describe the data and research context. In Section 2.5, we evaluate our proposed approach
using historical transaction data. Section 2.6 describes the field experiment we conducted.
Finally, we conclude in Section 2.7 by discussing the theoretical and managerial
implications.

2.2

Overview of the Related Literature

There is an increasing interest in predictive analytics in the information systems
(IS) community recently (Sahoo et al. 2012; Shmueli and Koppius 2011; Wang et al.
2013; Zheng and Padmanabhan 2006). In our context, we use predictive analytics instead
of explanatory statistical models. Predictive models are designed to predict customers’
out-of-sample behaviors while explanatory models are better suited to provide in-sample
model fit. In the following, we survey prior literature on recommender systems.
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2.2.1

Recommender System Techniques

Note that there are two widely adopted recommender system techniques: contentbased filtering and collaborative filtering. For detailed literature review, refer to Koren et
al. (2009), Sahoo et al. (2012) and Adomavicius and Tuzhilin (2005). The content-based
filtering technique in general has highly demanding data requirements. It requires that the
properties of product items, such as genres of movies and music, be specified. Also, it
needs customers’ explicit preferences, such as user ratings (i.e., after experiencing this
product, the user tells us whether he/she liked or disliked it, and how much, by providing
a rating on a scale of, for example, 1 to 5). Possibly due to the data requirements, this
method is not widely adopted.
The collaborative filtering technique, in contrast, has less demanding data
requirements, and is widely incorporated in recommender engines (Koren et al. 2009). In
general, there are two main approaches to collaborative filtering: the neighborhood
method and the latent factor model (Koren et al. 2009). The neighborhood approach may
be either user- or item-oriented, and is based on similarity measures such as Pearson
correlation coefficient (Hu et al. 2008). In the user-oriented implementation, which is its
original form, the neighborhood approach estimates unknown ratings based on recorded
ratings of users. The item-oriented implementation, which has become popular due to its
easy interpretability, predicts unknown ratings based on items most similar to the focal
item. Note that the both implementations are based on explicit feedback from users, such
as ratings.
The latent factor approach is used to uncover underlying factors that could explain
the observed explicit feedback from users. Matrix factorization is widely used in
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characterizing the latent factors of users and items (Bell et al. 2007; Paterek 2007). The
traditional form of those latent factor models is also based on explicit feedback, such as
ratings.
Of late, there is a growing interest in developing collaborative filtering algorithms
for situations where only the implicit feedback is available. For example, Hu et al. (2008)
developed a model based on the matrix factorization technique to account for implicit
feedbacks based on the frequency of people watching TV shows. One key feature of the
matrix factorization technique is that it requires characterization of a reasonable set of
latent factors that can capture the product characteristics. For the aforementioned study,
the TV genre set (such as comedy, action, horror, etc.) is small but comprehensive.
There has been some recent effort to design the collaborative filtering technique
when preferences dynamically change.

Sahoo et al. (2012) characterize a Hidden

Markov Model (HMM) and compare the HMM-based algorithm to other algorithms in
dynamic settings.
We evaluated the applicability of the aforementioned techniques to the online
grocery context.

First, as we detail later, we do not have explicit feedback about

customer preferences. We only have data about their purchase history. Second, neither
do we have the comprehensive feature set that characterizes customers’ decision-making
processes. For example, different products (e.g., tomatoes and onions) have different
feature sets. The decision to consume a particular product not only depends on the
individual’s taste preference for the product but also on additional processing that may be
done before consumption. It is natural for us not to be aware of those details. Third, the
dynamic user preference assumption is not pertinent in our grocery shopping context. So,
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the HMM-based approach that we discussed earlier is not relevant to our context. For
these reasons, we develop an SVM-based recommender system.
SVM, with origins in machine learning, transforms the original feature space into
a higher-dimensional feature space via the kernel trick (Vapnik 2000). The SVM
technique has been found to be robust in various contexts. Prior literature has found that
SVM performs better than multinomial logistic regressions in marketing (Cui and Curry
2005) and that SVM outperforms several other techniques, such as neural networks etc.
in forecasting stock market movement direction in finance (Huang et al. 2005). Another
salient feature of our paper is the managerial insights we generate from the experiment to
evaluate our approach. For this reason, we briefly survey the work on the impact of
recommender systems.
2.2.2

Impact of Recommender System

At the aggregate level, prior research has found that recommendations can have a
positive effect on sales and web impressions (Ansari et al. 2000; Das et al. 2007;
Bodapati 2008; De et al. 2010). There is a broader set of papers (Fleder and Hosanagar
2009; Oestreicher-Singer and Sundararajan 2012; Hervas-Drane 2013) that have studied
when products gain as opposed to lose sales because of recommendations; or whether
recommendations increase the market for niche goods as opposed to “long tails.” For
example, Fleder and Hosanagar (2009), show that counter to popular perception,
recommendations can lead to a reduction in sales diversity.
Prior research has also studied the impacts of the recommender systems at the
individual level. Senecal and Nantel (2004) experimentally compare the human expert-
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based (salesperson, independent experts), other humans (such as friends and
acquaintances), and an online recommendation.
recommendations

could

be

more

effective

when

They conclude that online
compared

with

humans’

recommendations. Some studies corroborate that providing customers with a predicted
system rating introduces anchoring biases that significantly influence customers’
preference ratings (Cosley et al. 2003; Adomavicius et al. 2011). Adomavicius et al.
(2014) study the impact of recommender systems on customers’ willingness to pay in the
context of purchasing digital songs. Hosanagar et al. (2013) found that personalization
brought by recommender systems helps widen users’ interests and thus creates
commonality among users. Even though our paper is mainly focused on developing a
recommendation system, we also evaluate the effectiveness of the recommendation
system to various types of forms of nudging (information, low-discount, or highdiscount).

2.3

Our SVM-Based Recommender System

SVM is called the “maximum margin classifier”. It is based on maximizing the
margins between two classes of an output to identify a separating hyperplane in a higherdimensional space (Refer to Appendix A for details about SVM). SVM with a Gaussian
kernel is recommended in scenarios similar to ours where the number of data points is
rather not huge (Hsu et al. 2010). Specifically, we develop a non-linear SVM based
recommender system that uses the Gaussian kernel transformation to identify the targeted
customers who are among the people with high propensity of purchasing the focal
product.
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We would like to highlight the differences in processes associated with a standard
classification task and ours. In general, classifiers are trained using the training dataset
and tested on the test dataset. The testing involves evaluating the correctness of the
classification, i.e., analyzing the number of Type I and II errors, in the testing dataset. In
scenarios where costs associated with Type I and II errors are different, and when testing
on the testing dataset, those variations in costs are also considered to infer the expected
cost incurred by the classifier (Witten et al. 2011). Therefore, the choice of the classifier
is often based on the expected cost measures.
Recall that our objective is not to simply train the classifier and evaluate them
based on the testing dataset. We are interested in identifying a restricted number of target
customers to be nudged. The underlying notion in our approach is that Type I errors in
our dataset are not necessarily problematic but potentially involve customers who have
not purchased the focal product because they are unaware of the product’s availability.
In an abstract sense, we are seeking to identify a subset of records with Type I errors to
nudge. Of course, the cardinality of the subset is based on the restriction from the online
grocer. Then, our focus is to develop a rank order for the Type I errors to choose the top
ranked records for nudging.
2.3.1

Steps

Even though we maintain our focus on the SVM approach, we also compare it
against other classifiers. Given that our objective is different from other prediction tasks
studied in general, the steps below to identify the customers to be nudged are agnostic to
the classifier technique.
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Step 1: We use the entire sample as the training set. We train the classifier on the
training set and obtain the best parameters by maximizing the cross-validation accuracy.
Such a process is recommended for SVM by Chang and Lin (2011). Obviously, we
extend the approach to other classifiers also and the best parameters obtained depend on
the technique adopted.
Step 2: The classifier is implemented with the best parameter combination from
the previous step on the entire training set (not just on the subset as we do in the n-fold
cross validation).
Step 3: Type I errors from the Step 2 implementation is considered for rank
ordering. The way in which the customers are ranked ordered may differ across the
techniques. The top-ranked customers that are obtained as a consequence are selected for
further analysis.
Step 4: We evaluate the output from Step 3 in two ways: (1) passively, we use the
historical data to evaluate how well the identified customers performed in the following
periods; (2) more actively, we conduct a field experiment where the identified customers
are nudged through information and/or couponing. The first way is indicative of the
natural process of discovery of the focal product by the customers. The second way is a
more useful test of our technique.
In the SVM approach, we are interested in the regularization and variance
parameters of the kernel function for Step 1. Specifically, we initially use a coarse gridsearch method, followed by a better-region-only grid-search to obtain the optimal
parameter combination. At each stage, we use the sequential minimal optimization (refer
to Hsu et al., 2010, for details) to identify the separating hyperplane.

In Step 3
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corresponding to the SVM approach, we rank order the Type I “errored” records
according to their corresponding distance from the separating hyperplane. As we discuss
later, we compare our SVM-based approach to other approaches as well. In one alternate
approach, we estimate a logit model that is a model in marketing to study customers’
discrete choices. The categorical variable in the SVM approach is treated as the response
variable in logit model and the feature set correspond to the predictor variables. Similarly,
the potential customers are rank ordered according to the fitted probability of purchasing
this product. The higher probability the customers have, the higher rank they receive in
Step 3. In yet another approach we study the kNN technique, which is widely used in
collaborative filtering. We rank order potential customers based on the mean distance of
them from surrounding grass-fed customers among k neighbors (k=10, 20). Finally, we
also compare against a random selection strategy by randomly drawing M (for different
values M=100, 200,… 1000) customers, calculating the number of successes, and redoing
the process 20 times to compute the average.

2.4

Research Context and Data Source

We evaluate our technique in an online grocery store, where the firm acts as an
intermediary between local farms, food partners, and customers. The purchase-todelivery process works as follows: (1) customers place orders online and specify the
pickup location (usually a meeting place such as schools, churches, etc.); (2) the firm
picks up the order from local farms and food partners; (3) the firm takes its delivery
trucks to the pre-destined sites; (4) the last mile problem is usually handled by customers
who drive to the pre-destined site to pick up the groceries.
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We intend to evaluate the nudging of customers to purchase grass fed beef. The
product choice is ideal in many regards. First, the margins are high for this product and
the firm prefers that high potential customers be exposed to it soon. So, the firm was
willing to send out limited number of coupons to expose customers. Second, grass-fed
appears to be a healthy option for customers (Cross 2011). Third, there appears to be
quite a bit of variation in customers’ knowledge about this product. So, it is possible for
customers, who have not purchased the product because of the lack of information, may
be nudged to shape their behavior. Fourth, the product was introduced in 2009. Thus, as
researchers, we have sufficient data for our analysis.
2.4.1

Overview of the Data Set

Our dataset includes all transactions from this online grocer since its launch until
December, 2013. There are in total around 100,000 orders placed by almost 18,000 users
on around 40,000 product offerings (We cannot provide specific numbers because of
confidentiality). The data consists of orders, order details, anonymized customer
information, and product details. For grass-fed beef, which is the focal product, the first
order was placed in January 2009. Our analysis only focuses on customer behavior
transactions since that time.
It turns out that the information about the nature of the products (whether it is
meat, organic, etc.) had to be manually categorized in our dataset. For this purpose, we
recruited 15 students to do the classification on a list of grocery products and were paid
$10 per hour for their effort. The list was prepared such that each product had
classification inputs from three students. For 92.27% of the products, the three inputs
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concurred. For those that did not have concurring results (4.82%), the product was
classified based on the majority of inputs. If there was no majority, for example due to
missing data, researchers’ input was used to determine the majority.
2.4.2

Features Set for the Classifiers

Consider t+1 as the time period over which we are interested in understanding a
customer’s interests in purchasing the focal product. The categorical binary variable, i.e.
the classifier label, is whether the customer purchased grass fed beef or not (1 if
purchased, and -1 if not purchased yet). The feature set for the classifiers – independent
of whether we use SVM, Logit, or KNN models – includes information from period t.
One of the features is the purchase expenditure measured as the average dollar amount
per order spent by the customer in t. Another is the purchase count defined as the total
number of orders placed by the customer in t.
Table 2.1 Features for the Classifiers
Variable
Meat
type

Organic
Nonorganic
Grassfed
Nongrassfed
Price

Explanation
Affinity to different meat
types, such as beef, pork,
other red meat, poultry,
seafood, other meat, dairy
products, not meat
Affinity
to
organic
products
Affinity to non-organic
products
Affinity
to
grass-fed
products

We Measure:
the number of the corresponding meat type
products purchased by a customer in 𝑡𝑡

the number of organic products purchased by a
customer in 𝑡𝑡
the number of non-organic products purchased by
a customer in 𝑡𝑡
the number of grass-fed products purchased by a
customer in 𝑡𝑡

Affinity to non-grass-fed the number of non-grass-fed products purchased
products
by a customer in 𝑡𝑡
Average expenditure

Purchase Purchase count

the average dollar amount spent in orders in 𝑡𝑡
the total number of orders placed by a customer in

𝑡𝑡
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Some of the manually identified categories mentioned earlier are also considered
as a part of the feature set. As grass-fed beef is a form of red meat, we count the number
of red meat purchases in t as a feature. Given that grass-fed beef is viewed as being
natural, we believe that customers’ affinity to organic products can also affect purchases.
So, we include in the feature set the number of organic products purchased by a customer
in t. Simply keeping track of the number of organic products purchased may not truly
capture the customer’s interest in grass-fed beef.

So, it is important to consider the

proportion of organic products also. Therefore, we account for it by including in the
feature set the number of non-organic products purchased in t. Grass-fed products are not
limited to beef. There are other products available with grass-fed options, such as cheese,
milk etc., The affinity towards such products is defined in the feature set as the number of
other types of grass-fed products purchased. Table 2.1 summarizes features used in the
classifiers (we cannot provide descriptive statistics because of confidentiality concerns
but we have provided for a shorter duration in Table 2.2).

2.5

Results and Discussion

From a prediction standpoint, the online grocer is interested in planning for a
three month period.

Such a timeframe accounts for seasonal variations in grocery

shopping. The question is: how long of a history do we analyze for predicting the
purchase in the following three months?
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2.5.1

Choosing the Training Window-Length

An individual’s consumption pattern, with groceries in particular, is well-known
to change across time. Obviously, a longer history leads to non-stationarity of data but
provides richer information because of the larger sample size. So, choosing the window
length involves a trade-off between non-stationarity and the sample size. We evaluate
how well different history window lengths – the previous three-, six-, nine-, or twelvemonths – are for predicting behaviors in the following three month period. The metric
for comparison is, among a certain number of M top predictions, how many purchase the
product in subsequent test window of three months. We also study the performance with
respect to varying M (i.e., M = 100, 200 … 1000). Note that we intend to use the best
window from these choices when we conduct the subsequent analysis. Since the window
length may be different for different classifiers, we execute the same process for the
classifiers we evaluate – SVM, Logit models and kNN.
Because we have data between 2009 and 2013, we have 14 pairs of training and
testing datasets, where the training window is three months. The descriptive statistics of
the features for one three month window (April, 2011 to June, 2011) are presented in
Table 2.2. Specific numbers for purchase expenditure and frequency are not provided to
maintain confidentiality. Also for the same reason, meat products are aggregated and one
single measure is shown in the table.
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics for a Typical Season
Meat Products
Dairy
Not Meat (NM)
Non-organic (NOrg)
Organic (Org)
Non-grassfed (NGF)
Grass-fed (GF)

Mean
2.43
2.22
3.19
5.70
2.31
7.63
0.24

Std
3.71
3.58
4.23
7.36
4.01
10.67
0.45

Max
36
26
32
57
31
86
4

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Median
1
1
2
3
1
4
0

Categorical Dependent Variable

0.22

0.41

1

0

0

Figure 2.1 shows the average number of successes across the 14 pairs as M varies.
Note that, for the SVM approach, the training period of 3 months generated the best
predictions. We also performed same analysis for other methods but found the same
three-month window to also be the best for kNN and Logit classifier models. Therefore,
we choose three months as the training window length for all subsequent analyses.

Figure 2.1 History window length vs. Non-stationarity
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2.5.2

Comparisons

As shown in Figure 2.2, our proposed SVM method appears to consistently
perform better than other methods. In the lower range, logistic regression is better than
kNN. However, kNN outperforms the logit model if we choose more than top 200. The
effect of the value of k in kNN is not significant. Random selection as expected is the
worst. We have not shown its performance in the figure as the number of successes is
very small. In the following subsection, we explore in detail the results obtained using
our (SVM-based) approach.

Figure 2.2 Method Comparisons for Average Number of Success

2.5.3

Evaluation of the SVM Approach without Active Nudging

We are next interested in investigating how well the customers identified by our
approach perform in the absence of any nudging interventions. Specifically, (1) how far
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ahead can our approach identify customers who purchase the product; and (2) how
frequent do those identified customers purchase the product thereafter? The objective of
such analyses is to identify the value from nudging the customers to purchase earlier.
Next, we define metrics for the analyses.
2.5.3.1 Conversion Rate
Recall that our SVM approach performs the estimation on a rolling window basis.
Given the rolling window, this subsection characterizes a structured way of computing
the conversion rate for customers identified by the SVM when there is no nudging.
Suppose 𝑟𝑟 is the training-window index and 𝑠𝑠 indexes the future time-periods thereafter.
Then, based on the top 1000 SVM predictions for the training window 𝑟𝑟, we can count
the number of customers who actually bought the focal product between periods 𝑠𝑠 and 𝑟𝑟

and denote it by𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 , where 𝑠𝑠 > 𝑟𝑟. By re-indexing 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 such that 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑟𝑟, we obtain 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

as the number of customers within the future 𝑡𝑡 periods identified by SVM when the
training window is 𝑟𝑟.

Figure 2.3 shows the variations with respect to 𝑡𝑡, the averages and variances of

𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (An example of analysis in this section could be found at Appendix B). Observe that

the variation is non-monotonic and one of the reasons is that the denominator to compute
the averages is not the same. When computing the average for large 𝑡𝑡 values, the number
of available training windows is small and vice-versa. An interesting aspect about the

figure is that as much as 20% of the identified customers eventually purchase the product
without any intervention by the retailer. Also, observe that a large number of customers
arrive quite late relative to when the SVM identifies them. In that regard, recall that each
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period marked along the x-axis corresponds to a three-month frame. It appears from this
analysis that both in terms of the number of customers as well as the time periods there
appears to be significant advantage if the firm were to nudge.

Figure 2.3 Means of Accumulative Number of Success in Lifetime Prediction

2.5.3.2 Units Purchased by Converted Customers
Instead of simply considering the number of customers who bought the focal
product, we consider here the number of units of the focal product bought. Similar to the
previous section, we denote 𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 as the total number of units customers purchased the

focal product in the future 𝑡𝑡 periods when the training window is 𝑟𝑟. The averages are
computed as before.

Interestingly, in Figure 2.4, we find that the SVM-identified

customers purchased the focal product 800 times. It appears that nudging is valuable for
the firm when considering the frequency of purchase.
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Figure 2.4 Means of Number of Repeat Purchases of Converted Customers in Lifetime

2.5.4

Motivation for Nudging Customers to Convert Earlier

According to analysis from previous subsections, we found that SVM-selected
customers do not all immediately convert to purchase the product and it could take some
of those top predicted customers two or three years to begin consuming this product.
Conditional on a customer buying the product subsequent to a specific training window,
we compute the average time before which the customer buys. 1 In Figure 5, the blue line
shows the average number of periods customers take to purchase for the various 𝑟𝑟. Note
that the data is right censored. It implies that the actual averages are larger than those in

Using the definition of 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 from Section 5.3.1, for a given time window 𝑟𝑟, we compute the
1
average number of periods customers take to convert as ∑𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=1(𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡+1) − 𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ) ∗ (𝑡𝑡 + 1), where
𝑇𝑇
T denotes the largest available t for 𝑟𝑟.
1
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the plots. Even then, we observe that average time it takes to convert customers is as
much as one year.
Next, conditional on the customer purchasing the focal product in a period
subsequent to a specific training window, we compute the average number of units
purchased per customer. In Figure 2.5, the dashed line shows the average number of
units purchased by the customers as 𝑟𝑟 varies. The figure shows that the average number

of grassfed beef purchases by the customers per period can be as high as 2 units. Again,
as mentioned before, the data is right censored.

Figure 2.5 Average Number of Waiting Periods and Repeat Purchase of Identified
Customers
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2.6

The Field Experiment

The previous section highlights the importance of expediting the purchase of the
focal product. So, in this section, we conduct an experiment with the same objective. The
additional purpose of the experiment is also to validate the modified SVM technique we
propose. Recall that, unlike the traditional machine learning literature, our focus is not to
evaluate Type I and II errors but to employ the Type I errors to nudge the customers. The
experiment offers the means to evaluate the nudging. Fortunately, the same online
grocery store evaluated was willing to conduct a field experiment to evaluate our
proposed approach. As Harrison and List (2004) point out, field experiments are ideal to
study since subjects do not perceive any of the controls as they do in lab experiments.
The following subsection details the experimental design.
2.6.1

Experiment Design

We gained access to run the experiment in January 2014. So, we used winter
2013 as the training data period to implement our modified SVM approach. Our SVM
approach identified and rank ordered the top 1000 customers. As a control group against
which SVM will be evaluated, we randomly choose 1000 customers for nudging. Note
that such would be the policy if there was no clear way to rank order the customers.
Within each group of 1000 customers, they are randomly assigned to one of the four
information treatments: (a) Info_only, sending out emails including only information of
grass-fed beef, such as nutritional values; (b) Low_Coupon, sending out emails including
both information and a 25% off coupon; (c) High_Coupon, sending out both information
and a 50% off coupon; and (4) No treatment where no nudging is imposed. Table 2.3
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shows the different information treatments as well as the number of customers assigned
to each treatment within each group. Note that the discounts are available only for
purchase of the focal product and the coupons expired one week after the customer
receives the coupons.
The customers in each of the three information treatments were reached via an
email. The text within the email, except for the discount details, is identical so that the
outcome differences can be attributed to the treatments. The coupon was designed such
that link within the email offered the coupon instead of an explicit code, which could
have been shared in deal aggregator websites. Also, it was indicated in that email that it
was a limited-time offer valid for one week.
Table 2.3 Experiment Design
Name

Treatments

Random group

SVM group

High_Coupon

Send out information + high
250 (R1)
discount coupons

250 (S1)

Low_Coupon

Send out information + low
discount coupons

250 (R2)

250 (S2)

Info_only

Send out information

250 (R3)

250 (S3)

NT

No treatment

250 (R4)

250 (S4)

2.6.2

Experiment Procedures

After we selected the 1000 SVM- and the 1000 randomly-identified customers,
we found some overlap across the two sets. So, we continued to draw from the customer
lists until we obtained 2000 unique customers. 250 customers are randomly selected from
the list and assigned to each treatment and the control group. The campaign was alive
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from January 13 to 26. In order to increase customers’ engagement, emails are sent to
each customer a day before the time they usually get their order. The last date a user
would be able to use the coupon was February 2.
2.6.3

Analysis and Discussion

In this section, we present the results of the experiment. We first focus on the
aggregate performance comparisons among different techniques, followed by a
discussion about the impact of different treatments, and some final analysis on the nature
of customer behaviors on outcomes.
We study the impact of the treatments as of April 2, 2014. All transactions from
January 13 to April 2, 2014 are used for the analysis. In that timeframe, 1680 customers
purchased the product. Of them, 988 are first-time purchasers and the rest of them had
repeatedly purchased the product. Of the first-time purchasers, 235 (24%) have
previously shopped here.
Table 2.4 Method comparisons of Conversion Rates
SVM

Logit

Random

Active nudging (Treatment groups) *

16.75%

10.28%

7.14%

Natural progression (No Treatment)

6.80%

2.45%

1.60%

Table 2.4 characterizes how customers converted under different treatments.
Note that, the number of customers who converted to purchasing the product is
significantly better under our approach than the random selection (6.8% versus 1.6%). To
focus on the effect of information, we do not consider the subjects to whom the email
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was sent but restrict our attention only to subjects whom we have tracked as having
opened the email. 2, 3 Even among those customers, responses are significantly better
under our approach.

Further, the information treatments were better than the no

information treatment. Thus, the table provides evidence that customers are not only
better identified by our approach but also they are also more likely to be nudged.
Interestingly, around 30% (68) of the 235 customers who purchased in the quarter were
also subjects in our information treatments 4.
Table 2.5 Descriptive Numbers of Logit list Overlapped with SVM and Random
SVM

Random

Total

SVM

Random

Total

High Coupon

146

7

153

Q1

206

7

213

Low Coupon

156

12

168

Q2

153

12

165

Information

149

8

157

Q3

172

8

180

NT

151

16

167

Q4

74

16

90

Our experimental design considered only our approach and the random selection.
However, we are also interested in understanding how our approach compares against the
Logit-based one. We used the intersection of the top 1000 ranked customers from the
Logit approach and the 2000 subjects in our experiment. We found 648 such customers –
2

Email is in general recognized as a poor marketing campaign approach due to its low open rates from
customers
(http://www.smartinsights.com/email-marketing/email-communications-strategy/statisticssources-for-email-marketing/). Fortunately, we have the ability to track the opening of the email using the
software that the company uses to manage the campaigns. This allows us to focus on consumers
conditional on opening the email.
3
In some cases, when consumers scroll down in their inboxes, the emails may get “opened” even if they
have not been actively read upon. So, our measures are only conservative.
4
We examined the weighted average number of previous orders for customers (i.e. the number in the
following parentheses) in different rank ranges: top 1000 (10.9), top 1000-5000 (3.88), beyond top 5000
(2.83). We found that the missing 70% are mostly customers with fewer purchase experience and we do not
have enough information to learn and predict their behaviors. This is consistent with the cold start problem
in traditional recommender systems.
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605 of them overlapped with the SVM-based approach and the rest with the random
selection. Note from Table 2.5 that the number of subjects in each treatment is roughly
the same across both Logit and SVM. From a rank standpoint, again as expected, there is
a larger overlap with the top 250-ranked customers (Q1), the next 250 (Q2), the next 250
(Q3), and the final 250 (Q4). Even then, we find that overall SVM does better than the
Logit model in terms of the effectiveness of nudging conditional on customers opening
the emails (10.45% versus 16.45%). Extrapolating our observations we conclude that
even if there will be no differences with respect to the subjects in the various treatments,
our approach appears to perform better than the Logit-based model. In Chapter 4, we
further analyze the behaviors of customers identified by our approach when they are
subjected to the different information treatments.

2.7

Conclusions and Implications

This paper investigates how, when dealing with products that are available in
limited quantities but may still exceed the current demand, customers may be nudged to
purchase them. Specifically, our main problem is to generate a rank order list of
customers to be nudged to purchase the product.

Existing recommender system

techniques do not typically deal with generating such a list. Accordingly, we developed a
Support Vector Machine (SVM) based approach that allows us to rank order customers
based on their propensity to purchase the product.
Without any nudges, we first evaluated how well our SVM based approach
performs compared to standard ones (such as logit regression, kNN etc.) in predicting
future purchases of consumers. Specifically, we impose a rolling time window on the
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historical transaction data from an online grocery store. We find that up to 20% of the top
predictions from SVM eventually become consumers who subsequently purchase the
product.

This measure is found to be significantly better than existing standard

techniques. It surprisingly turns out that our approach can predict the purchasing
consumer one year ahead when it happened in reality. This motivated us to consider
active nudging strategies that we implement with an experiment.
In the experiment, we subject customers to information versus coupons treatments
and analyze the differences in their behaviors. We find that, as before, our SVM based
approach performed better than other techniques.
various domains.

In summary, our work relates to

As mentioned earlier, traditional supply chain models focus on

optimizations assuming exogenous customers’ demand. Our paper allows for taking into
account behavioral aspects of customers when dealing with supply chain constraints. Our
work also contributes to the predictive analytics and recommender system literature. We,
to our best knowledge, are the first to propose a recommender system for products
available in limited quantities. One of the salient features of our technique is that we
identify customers marked as Type I errors as the ones to be nudged. In line with that,
we rank order potential customers for nudging. Our analysis is also distinctive in the
manner in which we use the experiments. Also, our results from the experiments are
useful actionable insights.
There are some limitations in our research. Firstly, features used in training our
SVM approach are limited. Due to privacy issues, we do not have access to customers’
demographic information, such as income. Secondly, our analysis lies in the online
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grocery context. If we had access to data from other contexts, the applicability of our
approach can be better investigated.
In the future, we would like to develop a model to further investigate how
information and coupons interact with different types of potential customers. This would
offer more insights regarding how to strategically leverage different strategies to nudge
potential customers to purchase and subscribe to the product. More personalized nudging
strategies could be implemented to improve the conversion rates.
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CHAPTER 3.
AN ANALYSIS OF INCENTIVE STRUCTURE IN
COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY: AN APPLICATION TO
CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM

3.1

Introduction

The collaborative economy – which includes firms like Airbnb, Kickstarter, Uber,
etc. – continues to grow at a staggering 25% pace annually (Forbes, 2013). According to
an article in MIT Sloan Expert, collaborative consumption is a $110 billion market (Sloan,
2013).

A crucial aspect to the functioning of these collaborative economies is the

incentive structure that encourages participation.

For example, Uber dynamically

changes the rates depending on the demand and supply of Uber cars in specific regions.
Kickstarter, on the other hand, gives the leeway to the project creators to offer incentives
to project backers so as to raise money for projects. While there are different forms of
incentive structures that exist, the objective in this paper is to use the structural modeling
approach to study one form of it.
Generally speaking, there are two forms of incentive structures in these
collaborative economies: one where a non-monetary resource may be shared and the
provider gains monetary incentives (e.g., Uber); and the other where money is the shared
resource and the providers obtain benefits (including the psychological satisfaction) from
the projects (e.g., Kickstarter). Prior research has studied the dynamic pricing model in
Airbnb to explore the incentive structure of the former kind (Edelman and Luca, 2013).
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In this paper, we focus on the latter kind of incentive structure. In those cases, because
the rewards are non-monetary, often a menu of options is provided. Also, because these
are non-monetary rewards, they are subject to information asymmetry issues.
Furthermore, as in Kickstarter.com, creators are allowed to dynamically change across
time the project reward structure (PRS), including the number of reward levels, their
denominations, reward types, and maximum number of backers for some rewards. So, the
information asymmetry and the levels of rewards offered create interesting tensions that
have implications on whether the project is successfully funded. The objective of our
research is to understand the impact of PRS on backers’ pledging decisions during
projects’ funding period. Specifically, we analyze a project panel data to investigate the
following questions. Firstly, how do various features of the PRS impact backers’
pledging decisions and how is the nature of the impact contingent on other project
features? Secondly, when and how should creators strategically modify the PRS during
the funding period to attract more backers?
To motivate the structural analysis, we first present a project-level reduced-form
model to investigate the impact of the reward structure on project outcomes. We find that
dynamically modifying reward structures during project funding process has significantly
positive impacts on influencing the project outcomes. We then develop a structural model
to investigate how reward structures affect the reward-level decision making process by
using a panel data. We find that reward levels that have been popular options till date or
that have gained recent popularity are perceived to be more favorable if they are pushed
lower down the menu of options, presumably by introducing weaker or less attractive
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options ahead of them in the menu. Thus we provide insights into how project creators
can strategically design PRS.
Understanding this mechanism is of significant importance to both industry
practitioners and academic researchers. On one hand, our research could shed light on
how to leverage non-monetary incentives to distract users’ attention to risks and get them
actively engaged in collaborative community. Also the findings could provide some
guidelines for project creators to strategically design the reward mechanism in a more
efficient way. On the other hand, our research extends previous research on how private
incentives work and also contributes to the rapidly increasing literature on collaborative
economy and crowdfunding.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we review
relevant literature in incentive design in collaborative economy, crowdfunding studies,
and product line design theory in marketing. Section 3.3 describes the research context
and data collection details. In Section 3.4, we present results from the reduced form logit
regression analysis. Following that, Section 3.5 describes the structural model to
understand the impact of PRS on contribution patterns. To account for endogeneity issues,
we further present a model in Section 3.6. Empirical results are shown in Section 3.7. The
counterfactual market simulations are presented subsequently. We conclude this paper
with theoretical and managerial implications.
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3.2

Literature Review

Our study points to three streams of literature: (1) incentive design in
collaborative economy; (2) crowdfunding research in management; and (3) product line
design in marketing.

3.2.1

Incentive Design in Collaborative Economy

In the collaborative economy, incentives are crucial for encouraging participation.
Edelman and Luca (2013) study the dynamic pricing model on Airbnb.com and suggest
the digital discrimination in online marketplaces. Meanwhile, crowdfunding is similar to
the single threshold public good in the sense that people’s monetary contributions need to
collectively achieve a threshold to make this project successfully funded. Prior research
has investigated mechanisms that facilitate coordination among subjects’ contributions to
alleviate free riding behaviors. Coordination mechanisms generally include, but are not
limited to: communication, threat of punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002), anonymity vs.
identifiability (e.g. a type of reputation), information (Hashim et al., 2012), and private
incentives (e.g. a centrally provided lottery ticket for every contribution) (Fuster and
Meier, 2010). Gneezy et al. (2011) further propose that the discussion should focus on
when and why incentives do and do not work (Gneezy et al., 2011). The analysis that we
conduct in our paper corresponds to the use of menu of non-monetary rewards as the
mechanism to nudge contribution in a public good setting.
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3.2.2

Crowdfunding Research in Management Studies

Prior crowdfunding studies examine users’ contribution patterns. For example,
rational herding behaviors have been observed in Prosper.com, a lending-based platform
(Herzenstein et al., 2011; Zhang and Liu, 2012). Burtch et al. (2013) find that crowding
out may occur where contributors may experience a decrease in marginal utility from
making a contribution as it becomes less important to the recipient in digitalism
crowdfunding (Burtch et al., 2013).
Scholars also look into how to alleviate the information asymmetry in those
crowdfunding platforms. For example, Lin et al. (2012) show that online friendship of
borrowers could serve as signals of credit quality of borrowers on Prosper.com (Lin et al.,
2012). Ghasemkhani et al. (2012) further empirically investigate the role of information
systems in alleviating adverse selection through information availability in a P2P lending
market (Ghasemkhani et al., 2013). However, to our best knowledge, there has been little
research on investigating how non-monetary incentives alleviate risk and encourage
participation on reward-based crowdfunding platforms.
3.2.3

Product Line Design in Marketing Research

A lot of studies examine how companies manage the product line by choosing the
length and the variety of the product line in marketing. We borrow theories in this area to
deepen our understanding of the reward structure including the length of the rewards and
types of rewards. Firms may compete through their product lines vertically and
horizontally. First, firms have the incentives to extend their product lines vertically to

37
attract customers of different willingness-to-pay for quality. Second, many firms may
offer products that are different in characteristics such as flavor, color, or scent.
Additionally, product line design is treated a competitive tool to compete with
other companies or products (Draganska and Jain, 2005). They also find that consumers
value product-line characterisitcs, such as quality and price, more than horizontal
characteristics (Draganska and Jain, 2006). To our best knowledge, our study is the first
one to bring the perspective of product line design into studying the reward structure
design of crowdfunding platforms.

3.3

Research Context and Data Collection

The reward-based crowdfunding platform we study is Kickstarter.com, one of the
largest crowdfunding websites. Kickstarter is aiming at funding creative projects, ranging
from films, music, comics and dance, to video games, food-related projects and
technology products. It has 13 different categories and 50 subcategories. Depending on
the role, the set of tasks are different. A campaigner needs to create a project, specify the
amount to raise, create the reward structure for the backers and decide the funding raising
duration. As a contributor, you go through different reward levels, decide which level to
contribute to and make a pledge. The funding mechanism is called fixed funding
campaign, or “all or nothing”. The project gets funded only if it achieves or exceeds the
goal; otherwise, money is refunded. More importantly, the reward, will be delivered only
if the project is successfully funded.
We collected a panel data set from this website from March to July 2013 using a
web crawler. All the active projects’ features have been collected, which include daily
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information about the funding status, the reward structure, comments related to the
project, and backers for each project. We have the data for all 13 categories. In the
preliminary analysis, we choose games and films categories as the sample to facilitate the
estimation process in the current empirical application. Games and films are among the
top five most popular categories in terms of the number of projects launched and the top
two popular categories in terms of the total amount of dollar donations as of August,
2014. The descriptive statistics are outlined in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of Kickstarter Projects
Variable

Mean

Min

Max

Project Success (1 = Success)

0.44

0

1

Project Duration

32.12

1

60

Project Goal (in $)

37656.22

1

10000000

# Reward Level Options in a Project

9.79

1

79

Total #Backers for a Project

136.75

0

66724.5

Total Donation for a Project (in $)

16611.74

0

5702153

On the reward menu, the reward options are typically sorted in ascending order
based on the dollar value of the reward level. In terms of the reward descriptions, the
creator could offer backers different types of rewards. Backers’ valuations toward those
rewards could affect their pledging decisions. Therefore, we manually categorized reward
descriptions and created several reward category variables for our model. Here are the
reward categories: (1) Decorative item related to the project, such as poster, sticker,
painting etc.; (2) In-kind item related to the project, such as shirt, mug, bag etc.; (3)
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Tickets for early access to the product; (4) Contributor acknowledgement, such as name
shown on the contributor list etc.; (5) Gratitude, such as sending out “Thank you
“ message; (6) product samples, such as a DVD of games; (7) backer engagement, such
as personal conversations with the creator, participating in designing the product etc.; (8)
other reward categories who do not follow in previous rewards. A sample of reward
descriptions for a project has been offered in Appendix E. As you could see in the
example, our current categorization mainly focuses on classifying the rewards into
different categories. We do not consider differentiating the quantity differences in certain
categories.
The categorization process works as follows. Firstly, we collected all the reward
description data in a file and ran a word frequency analysis. Among the top 200 high
frequent words, we identified 20 meaningful words. Secondly, based on the meaningful
word list, two of the authors manually coded around 500 reward descriptions and
completed the keyword list of different reward categories. Thirdly, according the
keyword list, we programmed to accomplish the major part of the coding. However, for
some of the reward descriptions, it could not be corrected categorized. The reason is that
among some reward levels, the creator tries to employ an accumulative reward design
method. For example, they will provide “all previous rewards” from a lower reward level
in a higher reward level. Therefore, one of the researchers coded the rest of the reward
descriptions according to the keyword list.
To facilitate our estimation, we choose a representative sample (25%) from the
films and games category proportionally with 500 projects in films and 200 in games,
respectively. Among those projects, the creators of 275 projects do not display their
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Facebook connection on the project campaign page. And 37 projects have missing data
on reward description due to missing data problem in our data collection process. Besides,
we remove projects that have 0 backers on any given day. The final data for estimation
include 313 projects (218 projects in film category and 95 projects in games category).
Even though the number of projects in the estimation is not huge, we use the daily reward
level data of each project and the data points used in the following estimation is
sufficiently rich.

3.4

Reduced-Form Analysis

Before we present the analysis from the structural model, we firstly describe the
reduced form analysis in understanding the effects of PRS on the funding outcome at the
project level. Insights from this analysis motivate our structural analysis in section 5.
We use binary logit regression for the reduced-form analysis. The prediction
variable is 1 if the project got successfully funded and 0 otherwise. The predictor
variables include creator-related features, project-related features and interaction between
backers and creators. Two main variables related to PRS are: (1) numRewards, which
indicates the number of reward options for each project; and (2) rewardDummy, which
represents if the number of rewards were modified by project creators during the funding
collection period. As mentioned before, data for this reduced-form analysis is from
Games, and Film categories.
The preliminary analysis of project funding data revealed two key insights about
the PRS: (a) Projects that offer more reward level choices are more likely to succeed; and
(b) Projects that modify the reward structure anytime during the funding period are more
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likely to succeed. Results are presented in table 3.2. The significantly positive impact of
PRS in the reduced form regression motivates us to develop a structural model to under
backers’ dynamic decision process based on a panel data.
Table 3.2 Estimation Results of Preliminary Analysis
Variable

Parameter Estimate* Standard Error

Intercept

0.0299

0.1172

Games - Dummy

-0.4092

0.0752

Project Duration

-0.0258

0.00330

Project Goal (in $)

-6.85E-6

9.046E-7

# Reward Level Options

0.0523

0.00675

Reward Menu Changed (Y = 1)

1.0081

0.0809

* Parameter estimates in bold letters are significant at least at the 99.9% confidence level.

3.5

A Structural Model of Backers’ Learning and Pledging Decisions

We develop a structural model of “Backers’ Learning and Pledging Decisions”.
We consider potential backers’ daily decisions of whether to back a particular project and
which reward level to choose from the available options in the PRS.

The model

incorporates the dynamic structure of the PRS, as well as the observable and
unobservable (to the researcher) features at the project level and the reward level.
Historical daily funding data for every reward level of a representative sample of projects
will be used to facilitate the estimation of and the inference for this model (in the current
empirical application, we used a sample of projects in two categories - Games and Films).
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3.5.1

Model Specification

Let T j denote the project duration (in days) of project j (j = 1, 2,…, J) and let R jt
denote the number of reward level options available to backers in project 𝑗𝑗’s rewards
menu at time 𝑡𝑡. The indirect utility for a backer from donating in reward level r ( r = 1, 2,
…, R jt ) of project j (j = 1, 2,…, J) at time

t (t = 1, 2, …, T j ) is specified as:

urjt= f ( Q j ) + α X rjt − β Pr + ε rjt

(1)

where, Q j is the latent quality or attractiveness of project j which is not
explained by the observable project characteristics. f ( Q j ) is a function through which
the project quality enters the utility function. X rjt are observable reward and projectlevel characteristics that include both time-variant as well as time-invariant features that
are observed by the researcher as well as the backers.

Pr is the dollar value or donation

amount of the reward. Finally, ε rjt is a mean-zero random shock that captures the effect
of unobserved (to the researcher) reward-level features that may influence potential
backers’ choice of specific reward levels in project j .
We assume that backers do not know the true quality of a project perfectly. That
is, they have uncertainty about the true quality, Q j . Due to this uncertainty, backers’
belief about the true quality of project j at time t is stochastic. Hence, in Equation (1), we
replace Q j with Q jt , which is backers’ belief about the true quality of project j at time t.
In the next sub-section, we explain the process by which backers learn about quality.
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We allow that backers may be risk averse with respect to the uncertainty in the

( ) takes the CARA form:

quality belief. Specifically, we assume that f Q jt

( )

(

− exp − ρ j Q jt
f Q jt =

)

(2)

where, ρ j is the level of risk aversion of backers of project j . Backers of project
j are risk averse if ρ j > 0 , risk neutral if ρ j = 0 , and risk seeking if ρ j < 0 . If a

project creator can attract several of his or her friends and acquaintances to back the
project, then such backers may have a lower level of risk aversion. Hence, we allow the
level of risk aversion of backers to be project specific. In particular, we allow the risk
aversion level of backers of a project to depend on the size of the social network of the
project creator. Specifically, the size of the creator’s social network on Facebook:

ρ j =+
ρ0 ρ1 ln (1 + # FBfriends )

(3)

Due to their uncertainty about project quality, backers choose the pledging
decision that maximizes their expected utility:

( )

urjt  E  f Q jt  + α X rjt − β Pr + ε rjt
E=



The expected utility from not donating in the project at time

u0 t = ε 0 t
3.5.2
In any period,

(4)

t is specified as:

(5)

Learning about Project Quality

t , backers face uncertainty about the project quality. This

uncertainty is signified by a prior distribution of backers’ belief about the quality of
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project j . We assume that backers’ prior beliefs should be right on average about the true
quality of a project. That is, backers have rational expectations such that the mean of
their prior belief is the true quality of the project. This assumption is standard in many
learning models (Coscelli and Shum, 2004), and is made to address the infeasibility of
identifying the risk aversion parameter separately from the prior mean. The prior belief is
assumed to be a normal distribution:
Q j 0 ~ N ( Q j , σ 02 )

(6)

With aggregate data on backers’ pledging decisions, we cannot identify the prior
variance, σ 02 . Thus, similar to many learning models (Narayanan et al., 2005) we fix the
initial prior variance to one.
In each period, backers update their belief about the quality of project j based on
the signals they receive through the status of the existing number of backers in the
various reward levels of the project. We also assume that backers do not track reward
level status daily over the project duration. Hence, at any time t , backers have the same
prior belief shown above, and they only use information about reward level status at time

t to update their belief.
Suppose there are Brjt −1 backers that have donated in reward level r of project j
until time t − 1 . We assume that this reward status generates an unobserved (to the
researcher) signal, srjt , that is normally distributed with mean equal to the true project
quality, Q j , and a variance that is inversely related to Brjt −1 :
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σ r2 
srjt  N  Q j ,


Brjt −1 

Hence, the precision of the signal,

(7)

Brjt −1

σ r2

, increases with the number of existing

backers for that reward level. We also allow the precision of the signal to depend on the
dollar value of the reward level,

Pr :

=
σ r2 exp ( γ 0 + γ 1 ln ( Pr ) )
A negative value for

γ1

(8)

would indicate that, controlling for the number of

backers in the reward levels, the precision of the signals is greater for the reward levels of
higher dollar value.
Backers are assumed to update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner. That is, they
combine their prior belief about project quality with the quality signals from the R jt
reward levels and apply Bayes Rule to form the posterior belief. As the prior belief and
the signals are normally distributed, the posterior belief is also a normal distribution and
is given by:

(

Q jt  N Q jt , σ Q2 jt

)

(9)

where

Q jt
=

and

σ Q2

R jt

jt

σ 02

Qj + ∑
r =1

σ Q2

jt

σ r2

Brjt −1 * srjt

(10)
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 1 R jt Brjt −1 
2
σ=
 2 +∑ 2 
Q jt
 σ 0 r =1 σ r 

−1

(11)

Note that the signals, srjt , are known to backers but are unobserved by the
researcher. Hence, the mean of the posterior belief, Q jt , is a stochastic variable from the
point of view of the researcher. Since the signals are assumed to have normal
distributions, it follows that Q jt is also a normal variable. In particular, by substituting
Equation (7) in Equation (10), we can derive the following:
Q=
Q j + η jt
jt

(12)

where
R jt

η jt ~ N (0, σ η ), σ η = ∑
2

2

jt

jt

r =1

σ Q4

jt

σ r2

Brjt −1

(13)

Given that the quality belief in any period is a normal distribution with mean Q jt
and variance σ Q2 jt , we can rewrite the expected utility of backers (Equation 4) as follows:


1


− exp  − ρ j  Q j + η jt − ρ jσ Q2 jt   + α X rjt − β Pr + ε rjt
E urjt  =
2



We will use the following equivalent form for the expected utility:
E urjt  = Q j + η jt −

1
ρ jσ Q2 jt + α X rjt − β Pr + ε rjt
2

(15)

(14)
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3.5.3

Estimation

Let the market size of backers be denoted by M. We assume a sufficiently large
size of potential backers (M = 10,000). If we assume that the unobserved shocks,

ε,

follow an i.i.d. Type I extreme value distribution, then backers’ probability of not
donating in project j at time t is:
R jt

M − ∑ Bkjt

Pr0 jt =

k =1

M

=

1
R jt

(

1 + ∑ exp E ukjt 
k =1

=

(16)

)
1

1

1 + exp  Q j + η jt − ρ jσ Q2 jt
2


R jt


 * ∑ exp (α X kjt − β Pk )
 k =1

Hence, we get the following expression:
R jt
 R jt



 R jt

1
2
Q j + η jt − =
ρ jσ Q jt ln  ∑ Bkjt  − ln  M − ∑ Bkjt  − ln  ∑ exp (α X kjt − β Pk ) 
k 1
=


k 1

2 =
k 1=







(17)

In the first period ( t = 1 ) when backers make their decision based on only the
prior distribution, we have:
R jt 1 =
=




 R jt 1
  1

Q
B
M
B
X
P
=
ln
−
ln
−
−
ln
exp
α
−
β
ρ jσ 02  (18)





(
∑
∑
∑
=
j
kjt 1 =
kjt 1
=
kjt 1
k ) −  −







=
=
k 1=
 k1



 k1
  2
R jt 1
=

We assume that the project qualities, Q j , follow a normal distribution that is
specific to the project category. That is, Q j  N

( µ ,σ ) .
C

2
C
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For all subsequent periods ( t = 2, 3,..., T j ), we have the following expression for

η jt :
R jt
 R jt



 R jt
 
1

η jt ln  ∑ Bkjt  − ln  M − ∑ Bkjt  − ln  ∑ exp (α X kjt − β Pk )  −  Q j − ρ jσ Q2 jt  (19)
=
k 1
=


k 1
 
2

k 1=
=







Now, conditional on Q j and η jt , for those who donate in project j , we have the
following conditional probability of choosing reward level r :
Prrjt ( Q j ,η jt ) =

exp (α X rjt − β Pr )
R jt

∑ exp (α X
k =1

kjt

(20)

− β Pk )

We use Maximum Likelihood Estimation to estimate the model parameters Θ .
The parameters to be estimated include the utility function parameters ( α , β in Equation
1), risk aversion parameters ( ρ 0 , ρ1 in Equation 3), quality signal parameters ( γ 0 , γ 1 in
Equation 8), and the normal distribution parameters for the quality of projects in each
category ( µC , σ C , C = 1, 2,.. ). Hence, Θ ={α , β , ( ρ 0 , ρ1 ) , ( γ 0 , γ 1 ) , ( µC , σ C )} .
For a random sample of J projects, the likelihood function is given by:
Tj


 φ ( Q , µ , σ ) * φ η , 0,
∏
j
C
C
J 
 jt
t =2
L ∏
=

j =1 
Brjt
*
Pr
,
Q
η
 ∏
rjt ( j
jt )
r ,t


{(

)

}

R jt

σ Q4

∑σ
r =1

jt

2
r


Brjt −1  


 (21a)
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where φ ( Q j , µC , σ C ) is the p.d.f. of the normal distribution of project quality when the


φ
project is in category C, η jt , 0,



R jt

∑
r =1


 is the p.d.f. of the normal distribution in
B
1
σ r2 rjt − 


σ Q4 jt

Equation (13), and the last term is the conditional likelihood of the observed number of
backers across the various reward levels of the project.
One issue with the above likelihood function is that, relative to the number of
backers for a project, the potential market size ( M ), tends to be a large number for most
projects. This can result in very small standard errors of the parameter estimates in the
maximum likelihood procedure. Hence, we adjust the likelihood function in order that
the standard errors are not influenced by the size of the potential market size. A similar
idea of adjusting the likelihood function was also used in prior research (Song and
Chintagunta, 2003). Consequently, we minimize the following ‘scaled’ negative loglikelihood function in the estimation:
3.6

Correct Endogeneity Issues

As our interests lie in analyzing the impact of changing the reward structure on
backers’ behaviors, one potential issue is that the data we observe is already a reflection
of project creators’ strategic behaviors. In other words, creators’ behaviors are
endogenously generated and it is not fair to just model the backer-side’s behaviors. To
resolve this concern, we endogenize creators’ decisions in our model. Specifically, we
correct endogeneity for creators’ decision to adjust the number of reward options in the
reward menu.
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We model creators’ decision y jt as changing the number of reward options at a
given day t for project j. y jt is a discrete ordinal decision variable. If y jt is a negative
integer, it means removing the corresponding number of reward options. If y jt is 0, it
means the creator does not make any change to the number of reward options. If y jt is a
positive integer, it means adding the corresponding number of reward options.
We use ordered probit model to model creators’ decisions. The assumption is that
there is a continuous latent metric

y*jt underlying the ordinal response y jt .

−1, y*jt ≤ ν 0

*
 0 ,ν 0 < y jt ≤ ν 1
y jt = 
*
 1 ,ν 1 < y jt ≤ ν 2
 2 , y*jt > ν 2


(22)

where, ν k (k = 0,1, 2) are thresholds that partition the latent utility into a series of
regions corresponding to the various ordinal categories. In our data, we labeled removing
number of rewards as y jt = −1 , making no changes as y jt = 0 , adding one reward as
y jt = 1 and adding more than one reward as y jt = 2 .
We allow for endogeneity in the latent metric. In order to do this, we specify the
latent utility of creators of project j at time

y*jt =
τ 0 + τ 1Y jt + ξ jt

t as:
(23)
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where Y jt are observable project-level characteristics that are observed by the researcher
as well as the creator and affect the latent utility of the creator. ξ jt are mean-zero random
shock that are unobserved (to the researcher) and affect creators’ latent utility, where

ξ jt  N (0, σ ξ2jt )

(24)

Y jt serves as instruments that are uncorrelated with ξ jt . We model there is a
correlation ω between ξ jt and η jt (in equation 12).

ω = corr (ξ jt ,η jt )

(25)

Therefore, given ηjt , the conditional probability of ξ jt | ηjt is

a normally

distributed random variable which has the following distribution.

ξ jt | ηjt  N (ω

σξ
ση

jt

ηjt , σ ξ2 (1 − ω 2 ))
jt

(26)

jt

The method we model endogeneity is known as the “limited information”
approach, which has been used in prior literature (Villas-Boas and Winer 1999; Nair
2007). There are three reasons why we need to model creators’ behaviors in this way: (a)
in the crowdfunding context, we are not sure about the objective function of the project
creator. Therefore, we could not simply assume that they are to maximize the total
pledged amount or total number of backers for the project; (b) even if we are aware of the
objective function of the project creator, imposing function forms would bias our
estimation; (c) our primary goal is to make recommendations for the reward structure
change, which would not be possible if restrictions from the optimal structure design is
imposed in the estimation process.
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Therefore, the probability of each ordinal outcome is specified as:

−1| ηjt ) =
φ (ν 0 − τ 0 − τ 1Y jt )
Pr( y jt =
Pr( y jt= 0 | ηjt )= φ (ν 1 − τ 0 − τ 1Y jt ) − φ (ν 0 − τ 0 − τ 1Y jt )
Pr( y jt= 1| ηjt )= φ (ν 2 − τ 0 − τ 1Y jt ) − φ (ν 1 − τ 0 − τ 1Y jt )

(27)

Pr( y jt =2 | ηjt ) =1 − φ (ν 2 − τ 0 − τ 1Y jt )
Where, φ is the p.d.f of ξ jt | ηjt in equation 26.
Estimation of models involving ordered probit model will not result in a unique
solution. For identification purpose, we impose some identification constraints. We
normalized the variance of ξ jt as 1, which implies σ ξ2jt = 1 . And we normalize one of the
threshold as 0, ν 0 = 0 . Therefore, in addition to the parameters that need to be estimated

Θ ={α , β , ( ρ 0 , ρ1 ) , ( γ 0 , γ 1 ) , ( µC , σ C )} , we also need to estimate the parameters in the
latent utility function ( τ 0 ,τ 1 in equation 23), the correlation parameter ( ω in equation 25),
and the thresholds in the ordered probit model ( ν 1 ,ν 2 in equation 27). Thus, all
parameters

that

need

to

be

estimated

are

Θ ={α , β , ( ρ 0 , ρ1 ) , ( γ 0 , γ 1 ) , ( µC , σ C ) , (τ 0 ,τ 1 ), (ν 1 ,ν 2 ), ω} .
We also use the MLE approach to estimate the parameters. The likelihood
function – equation 21a become as follows:
Tj
R jt



σ Q4 jt
 φ ( Q , µ , σ ) * φ η , 0,
Brjt −1 
∑
∏
j
C
C
jt
2
J 


r =1 σ r
t =2


L = ∏
Tj
j =1 
2
m
Brjt
 ) I jt
 * ∏ Prrjt ( Q j ,η jt )
=
η
*
Pr(y
m
|
∏
∏ jt
jt

t = 2 m = −1
 r ,t

{(

)

}




 (28a)
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where I mjt is an indicator variable that denotes the decision m (m=-1, 0, 1, 2) the creator
of project j made at time t .
The scaled log-likelihood function – equation 21b will become as follows:

Tj
R jt
 

σ Q4 jt
 ln φ Q , µ , σ  + ln φ η , 0,

B
∑
∑
j
C
C )
rjt −1
J 
2
  (=
  jt

t 2=
r 1 σr
− ln ( L ( Θ ) ) =
− ∑ 

 
j =1 
 + ∑ Brjt *ln Prrjt ( Q j ,η jt )
 r ,t

{

(

)}



BrjT j
 ∑
r
*

Mc








 (28b)



 Tj  2 m

− ∑  ∑  ∑ I jt *ln(Pr(y jt =
m | ηjt ))  
=j 1 =

 t 2  m = −1
J

3.7

Estimation Results

In this section, we first present the estimation results after we correct the
endogeneity issues, and then discuss the major differences of results before and after we
account for the endogeneity issues.
3.7.1

Results after Correcting Endgoeneity Issues

Based on the AIC/BIC criterion, we reported estimation results of the following
structural model, which are shown in Table 3.3. First, we look at the results for the
backers’ behaviors. Among the project level variables, we find that most backers prefer
to not donate in projects in the Game and Film categories when compared with the
outside option. This is inferred from the large negative means of project qualities in these
categories ( µGame , µ Film ) and the fairly low variances of the project qualities ( σ Game ,
2

2
σ Film
). Note that these estimates correspond to a fairly large market size of potential
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backers (M = 10,000). Hence, given the large market size, vast majority of the backers
prefer not to donate in an individual project.
From the estimates of the parameters corresponding to the variance of quality
signals from reward levels, we can infer that, controlling for the number of backers in the
reward levels, the precision of the signal is greater for the reward levels with lower dollar
value ( γ 1 = 0.5465). In other words, when backers donate into lower dollar value rewards
it gives a more precise signal of the project quality. One possible explanation is that the
content of reward levels with lower dollar value is typically more generic tastes while
that of reward levels with higher ones is more unique tastes. Therefore, backers would
perceive a higher precision signal from reward levels with lower dollar value.
From the estimates of the parameters corresponding to the level of risk aversion
of backers of particular projects, we see that backers are generally risk averse ( ρ0 =
2.2222). However, project creators that have larger social networks on Facebook are able
to attract backers to their projects that are less risk averse ( ρ1 = -0.4054). One
explanation could be that many of those backer may be friends of the creator who are less
risk averse to donating in his or her project despite the uncertainty of the project quality.
Next, among the coefficients for the project and reward level variables, we find
that more popular projects that have managed to garner large amounts of donations till
date continue to attract more backers (coefficient value of 0.7394). However, the
percentage of the Goal reached till date acts oppositely (coefficient value of -0.1036).
Next, we focus on the PRS to see how the project reward structure influences
backers. First, of course, we get the intuitive result that, all else equal, backers are less
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likely to donate in higher dollar value reward levels (coefficient of

Pr =1.4052). Next,

we see that controlling for everything else, backers are less likely to donate in a project
with more reward level options (coefficient value of -2.1025). To the extent that higher
dollar value reward levels tend to be lower down in the menu of rewards options, we also
find that the reward levels that are further down the menu tend to be less popular
(coefficient of r_loxn =-0.2667). But interestingly, reward levels that have been popular
options till date (i.e., high Brjt −1 ) are perceived to be even more favorable if they are
pushed lower down the menu of options (coefficient of Brjt −1 * r_loxn =0.0763),
presumably by introducing weaker or less attractive options ahead of them in the menu.
Hence, while the early preliminary analysis suggested that a change in the PRS over the
course of the project duration increases the odds of success for a project, here we see that
project creators need to be strategic about changing the PRS. In particular, the
attractiveness of popular reward levels can be further improved by introducing new
reward level options above them. This finding is one of our most important contributions
to the existing literature on sharing economy. Different from Burtch et al. (2013), we find
creators could strategically design their incentives to attract backers at the reward level.
This change in the attractiveness of certain reward options due to a change in the
PRS may be explained by the Contrast Principle or the theory of Context-dependent
preferences in the Consumer Behavior Theory literature (Tversky and Simonson, 1993).
According to these theories, consumers are more comfortable comparing and contrasting
between more similar alternatives, and the relative attractiveness of an alternative can be
increased by strategically introducing new alternatives. This result may also be explained
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by the behavioral theory. As reward levels that are further down the menu tend to be less
popular, it is reasonable that the placement of a new incentive alternative should be above
an already popular reward level rather than below. Further investigation can reveal
whether cognitive theories of consumer choice behavior such as the Contrast Principle or
Construal Level Theory (Trope et al., 2007) can indeed play a crucial role in the
successful dynamic design of the PRS.
Besides, creators also need to pay attention to the content of the reward. We find
that rewards that include Product Samples such as, say, a game DVD, are most attractive
for backers (Coefficient value of 0.8336). Other reward types such as Decorative Items
(e.g., posters and stickers) Unique or special reward types, and Backers’ Engagement in
Product Creation (e.g., participating in designing the product), Contributor
Acknowledgement (e.g., name shown on the contributor list) are also fairly valuable
propositions for backers (positive coefficients of 0.2404, 0.1915, and 0.1263,
respectively). Rewards that include tickets for a one-time event or simple expressions of
gratitude, such as “Thank you” messages, are the least attractive among all reward types,
presumably because they elicit very low engagement with the project and therefore the
backers are not attracted by those reward options.
In this part, we look at results of the creator side after we correct the endogeneity
issue. There exists endogeneity between creators’ decision to change the number of
reward options and backers’ behaviors (positive significant correlation estimate, 0.1159).
Among the project level variables that affect creators’ latent utility, we find that
the higher number of barren rewards in the reward menu, the less likely the creator is to
remove reward options (the positive coefficient of 0.0406). Meanwhile, the higher
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proportion of barren rewards in the reward menu, the less likely the creator is to add
reward options (the negative coefficient of -0.6084).
The thresholds for the latent utility of the creator are estimated to be 5.6277 and
6.1012, which are both statistically significant.
Table 3.3 Estimation Results of Structural Model Using Daily Aggregate Data
Parameter

Variable

Estimate*

Std. Error

µGame

-7.5286

0.976

µ Film

-8.2498

1.0283

2
σ Game

0.7664

0.1034

2
σ Film

0.8959

0.127

ρ0

2.2222

0.2542

-0.4054

0.0393

γ0

-1.8693

0.4046

γ 1 (Coeff. of Pr )

0.5465

0.12

Log(1+ # Projects backed by creator)

0.0708

0.1302

Log(1+Donation till date in $)

0.7394

0.041

%Goal Reached till date

-0.1036

0.0111

Time period (t)

0.0305

0.0106

Distribution of
Project Quality

ρ1 (Coeff. of ln(1 + #FB

Risk Aversion

friends)
Variance of Quality
Signal from Reward
Levels

Project and Reward Level Variables (Xrjt)
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Table 3.3 continued
Parameter

Std.

Estimate*

Error

t_squared

-0.0195

0.022

I(t = Day1, Day2, Day3)

-0.1747

0.1089

I(t = Day Tj-2, Day Tj-1, Day Tj)

0.1738

0.0938

Log(1+ # Options in Rewards Menu)

-2.1025

0.242

-0.0014

0.0024

-0.2667

0.003

0.0763

0.0012

0.2515

0.0149

0.0258

0.0201

I (Tickets for early access to product)

-0.2052

0.03

I (Contributor Acknowledgement)

-0.0398

0.0166

-0.4154

0.0142

0.8606

0.0165

0.1326

0.0276

0.2195

0.0174

1.4052

0.085

Variable

# Total backers (in 100s) till previous period in
reward level r ( Brjt −1 )
Location of reward level r in Rewards Menu
(r_loxn)

Brjt −1 * r_loxn
Project and Reward Level Variables (Xrjt)
I (Decorative Item = Poster, Sticker,
Indicators
for
Reward
Categories
(a reward
level can
be
combinatio
n of
multiple
categories)

Painting, etc.)
I (In-Kind Item = Shirt, Mug, Bag,
etc.)

I (Gratitude = Signed / Thank You
message)
I (Product Samples like DVD)
I (Backer Engagement in Product
creation)
I (Other or Unique Reward Types)

$ Value of reward level r ( Pr )
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Table 3.3 continued
Parameter

Variable

Estimate*

Std. Error

Creator side Variables (Yjt)
Correlation parameter

0.1159

0.0038

Constant parameter (𝜏𝜏0 )

3.5697

0.1469

Number of barren rewards

0.0406

0.0139

Proportion of number of barren rewards

-0.6084

0.2304

Threshold 1 in ordered probit model (𝜈𝜈1 )

5.6277

0.1348

6.1012

0.5801

Threshold 2 in ordered probit model (𝜈𝜈2 )

* Parameter estimates in bold letters are significant at least at the 95% confidence level.

3.7.2

Comparison of Results Before and After Correcting Endogeneity

For most of the parameter estimates, the estimates do not change much under
models before and after correcting endogeneity. However, there is a huge change for the
variable we correct endogeneity, namely, the number of reward options (-0.9111 and 2.1025, before and after). We found that the impact of the number of reward options
would be underestimated if we do not consider endogeneity. This implies that if there is
endogeneity, as there are more backers contributing to the project, the creator will
strategically be more likely to add reward options. The negative impact of the number of
reward options would be even larger.
The other difference in the estimation is that the sign of the variance of quality
signal is reversed before and after correcting endogeneity (-0.6437 and 0.5465, before
and after). Before correcting the endogeneity, the negative sign of

γ 1 indicates that when

backers donate into higher dollar value rewards it gives a more precise signal of the
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project quality. After correcting the endogeneity, the positive sign indicates that when
backers donate into lower dollar value rewards, it gives a more precise signal of the
project quality. As we explained earlier, lower dollar value rewards are more likely to be
more generic reward types while higher dollar value rewards are more unique. The
possible explanation is that if creators could strategically change the reward structure, the
backers will not value the high dollar value rewards to get signals as much as getting
signals from lower dollar value rewards.
3.8

Counterfactual Analysis

According to the findings in Section 6, we find that project creators could
strategically manipulate the reward structure. In this section, we conduct several sets of
counterfactuals to investigate: (1) the impact of adding a new reward option to the reward
structure; (2) the impact of changing the timing to make changes to the reward structure.
We simulate the above scenarios using the following project setting. The project
category we choose is film category. The starting reward dollar structure for the project is
$10, $10, $10, $10, $50, $50, $50, $50, from top to bottom. We fix the reward type 5 for
each reward to be the same so that the only difference across reward options is the
location on the reward menu for this project. We set the project quality to be the sum of
the quality mean and quality standard deviation in the film category 6 . The project
duration is set 30 days.

5

In the simulation, the reward type for each reward is a combination of decorative item, in-kind
item, contributor acknowledgement, backer engagement, and unique reward.
6
Given the project setting, this quality value could give us reasonably good simulation results.
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3.8.1

Adding a Reward Option to the Reward Structure

In this part, we investigate the impact of adding a reward option to the reward
structure. Here we fix the timing of making such changes, such as toward the end of the
project duration. We simulate two different cases: (1) adding a reward, such as $5, above
the focal $10 reward options; (2) adding a reward, such as $30, below the focal $10
reward options.
The main findings are as below: (1) in Figure 3.1, we find that adding a reward on
top of a popular reward could make the popular one even more popular; however, the
total number of backers actually decreases compared to the original reward structure. (2)
In Figure 3.2, we could see that adding a reward below the popular reward distracts
attention from other rewards and make existing rewards less popular.

3500

Number of backers

3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Day
orignial rwd-10-3

orignial rwd-10-4

add 5 on top rwd-10-3

add 5 on top rwd-10-4

add 5 on top rwd-5

Figure 3.1 Change of number of backers - add above reward options
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add 30 below rwd-10-3

Figure 3.2 Change of number of backers - add below reward options

3.8.2

Changing the Timing of Making Changes to the Reward Structure

In this section, we conduct experiments to study the impact of different timing in
changing the reward structure. In other words, we make the structure change either (1) in
an early stage or (2) in a relatively later stage.
The main findings are as follows: (1) in Figure 3.3, we could see that adding a
reward above a reward in an early stage distracts attention from other reward options.
Therefore, it actually slows down escalation of rewards becoming popular ones and not
make the other reward options even more popular; (2) however, adding a reward above a
reward in a later stage could help make the already popular reward even more popular
(Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.3 Change of Number of Backers - add above reward options (t = 11)

3.9

Conclusions and Implications

A crucial aspect to the functioning of these collaborative economies is the
incentive structure that encourages participation. In this paper, we have used the
structural modeling approach to study how providers or project backers respond to
dynamic changes in non-monetary incentives in reward-based crowdfunding, one type of
the collaborative economy. First, our reduced-form analysis showed that a change in the
project reward structure over the course of the project duration increases the odds of
success for a project. The findings from the structural model further indicate that reward
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levels that have been popular options till date or that have gained recent popularity are
perceived to be more favorable if they are pushed lower down the menu of options,
presumably by introducing weaker or less attractive options ahead of them in the menu.
This implies that project creators could strategically and dynamically design the reward
structures during the funding period to attract more backers. This finding suggests that
cognitive theories of consumer choice behavior such as Contrast Principle or the theory
of Context-dependent preferences may have a crucial role in the successful dynamic
design of non-monetary incentive structures. According to the counterfactual analysis, we
find that adding a reward above reward options in a later stage could help escalate the
popular rewards become even more popular compared to making changes in an earlier
stage. Furthermore, when adding reward above the popular rewards, adding above the
popular ones could make the popular ones even more popular while making the total
number of backers decrease.
Our research is of significant importance to both academic research and industry
practice. On one hand, we could provide some guidelines to the project creators regarding
how to strategically manipulate the reward structures to incentivize users to participate.
On the other hand, our research extends and contributes to incentive design in
crowdfunding and collaborative economy in general. To our best knowledge, this is the
first paper to investigate the non-monetary incentive design in crowdfunding. This
pioneer work can easily prompt the investigation of other interesting research questions
in this area.
The current research has some limitations that could be addressed in future
research. Firstly, our analysis only uses two categories. It would be interesting to look at
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how the results are contingent on different categories. We are working on generalizing
the findings to more categories. Secondly, when we categorize the reward descriptions,
we focus more on characterizing rewards into different categories. If the quantity
differences could be considered as well, the results would be more interesting. Those
issues would be addressed in our future research.
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CHAPTER 4.
EFFECTS OF INFORMATION AND COUPONS ON
CUSTOMERS’ PURCHASE BEHAVIORS: A FIELD
EXPERIMENT

4.1

Introduction

In Chapter 2, we develop a SVM based approach to identify customers to be
nudged when dealing with products faced with supply constraints. Also we investigate
how well the identified customers could be converted by nudging strategies, such as
sending out information and/or coupons using emails. In this chapter, we further explore
the effects of the nudging strategies on customers’ purchase behaviors. Specifically, we
explore the short-term and long-term role information and coupons play in shaping
customers’ behaviors and also the effects of information and coupons on influencing
different types of customers.
Email targeting has emerged as an important digital channel to offer personalized
promotions to customers. Email coupons are similar to traditional offline coupons in the
sense that they are targeted to individual customers. Coupons often act as a marketing
tool to charge a lower price to customers who have a lower willingness-to-pay. This view
is supported by a set of empirical work studying the characteristics of customers who take
advantage and redeem the traditional offline coupons (Swaminathan and Bawa 2005;
Chiou-Wei and Inman 2008). However, surprisingly, given the popularity of email
targeting in the industry, there has not been much work that focused on studying email
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targeting specifically probably because of limited access to such marketing data.
Interestingly, in one of recent papers on email targeted promotions, Sahni et al. (2014)
analyzed data from a set of field experiments on an online platform and found that email
promotions could serve as a role to inform customers. Although their work expands the
role of coupons from just attracting lower willingness-to-pay customers to informing
customers as well, they do not differentiate impacts of email targeting of different
promotion depths. In another stream of marketing literature, characteristics of coupons,
such as promotion depths (10%, or 20% off discount), have also been broadly studied and
shown that they have significant different impacts on customers’ price expectations
(Kalwani and Yim 1992).
To our best knowledge, there is no work investigating how email promotions of
different depths plays different in informing customers or acting as a price discrimination
tool. Also, if coupons could serve as a form of “advertising”, why not just send out
information or “advertisements” instead of digital coupons? Does the high discount
coupon play the same role in informing customers as the low discount one does? Also, in
our context where there is limited product availability, strategies other than just sending
coupons may be more desirable. For some customers, it is sufficient that we provide
information alone but no coupons. Also, when a coupon is provided, customers may
perceive the product unpopular and therefore may anchor their valuations for the product
lower (Dodson et al. 1978). The anchoring effects have to be considered when sending
coupons. Little has been formally studied about the different impacts of information
versus coupons, and coupons of different promotion depths, on nudging new customers to
purchase.
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In this paper, we explore the aforementioned research questions using data from a
field experiment run in an online grocery store. Analysis of the experimental data
revealed some interesting managerial insights. We find that low coupons are more
effective in performing as an information role in the long term than pure information
strategies. However, high coupons serve more as a role in attracting price sensitive
customers in the short term and do not perform well in the long run in informing the
customers. We find that customers who are new to the store are more likely to be nudged
by high discount coupons; whereas customers who have engaged with the store over a
longer duration are converted using information. However, we did not find coupons with
a low discount value to be as effective. We also provide a possible explanation for our
observations.
In this chapter, Section 4.2 presents the relevant prior literature on coupons and
email targeting. The experiment design will be described subsequently. Section 4.4
analyzes the data from the experiment. Conclusions and implications will be discussed in
Section 4.5.

4.2

Literature Review

In this part, we review prior work that is related to our study: (1) effects of
coupons on customers’ expectation and purchase behaviors; (2) effects of characteristics
of coupons on effectiveness of promotions.
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4.2.1

Effects of Coupons on Customers’ Expectation and Purchase Behaviors

There has been a lot of research that study the impact of traditional offline
coupons on customers’ expectation and purchase behaviors. Prior literature has found
conflicting effects of coupons on consumers’ choices and brand evaluations. Neslin and
Shoemaker (1989) found that promotions negatively influence brand evaluations.
However, Davis et al. (1992) provided disconfirming evidence regarding this aspect. In
addition, research shows that consumers’ choices are positively impacted by the discount
rate (Leone and Srinivasan 1996). However, price promotions could also reduce
postpromotion choices because the brand quality could be reduced (Dodson et al 1978),
or customers’ price expectations could be lowered (Monroe 1971).
Although email targeting becomes widespread in industry, we found there is only
limited amount of work studying the impact of targeted emails on those behaviors,
probably because of limited access to the marketing data. Wattal et al. (2011) study
implications of personalization of email contents. Kumar et al. (2014) study the impact of
marketing activities on the propensity of a consumer getting in and out of email
marketing lists. Sahni et al. (2014) analyzed 70 randomized experiments and found that
targeted promotions can serve as a form of “advertisement”.

4.2.2

Effects of Characteristics of Coupons on Effectiveness of Promotions

Characteristics of coupons include promotion frequency (how frequent a coupon
is targeted to customers), promotion depth (to what extent the price is discounted, such as
10% or 20%), and promotion frame (percentage off versus cents off). Research shows
that both frequency and depth of promotion have significant impacts on consumers’ price
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expectations (Kalwani and Yim 1992). There is also work that study how promotion
frame moderates the effect of promotion depth on postpromotion price expectations and
choice (DelVecchio et al. 2007).
Although Sahni et al. (2014) concluded that targeted promotions can serve as a
form of “advertising”, its findings are quite general regardless of the characteristics of the
promotions. Actually in their data, email promotion offers consist of different promotion
depths and promotion frames. To our best knowledge, there has been no research so far
that studied if different promotion depths play different roles in informing customers.
Also no prior work has compared the role of coupons versus pure information. In other
words, if coupons could serve as a form of “advertising”, why not just send out
information or “advertisements” instead of digital coupons? Specifically, in our context
where there is limited product availability, strategies like sending out pure information
about the product, other than just sending coupons, may be more desirable in certain
circumstances. Therefore, we conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness and
effects of information and/or couponing in influencing customers’ behaviors.

4.3

Experiment Design

We conduct a field experiment in an online grocery store to investigate different
roles of promotion depths in informing customers and the impacts of information and
coupons on different types of customers. The research context is the same as used in
Section 2.6.1. The experiment design has been shown in Table 2.3. The experiment
procedures have been described in Section 2.6.1 and Section 2.6.2. We will not repeat
those contents in this chapter.
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4.4

Analysis and Discussion

We conduct two sets of analysis in this section. First, we analyze the experiment
data and investigate the information carryover effect of information and coupons in
nudging customers to purchase. Second, we further understand the effects of information
and coupons in converting different types of customers.
4.4.1

Information Carryover Effects of Information and Coupons

In this section, we analyze the role of coupons of different promotion depths in
influencing customers’ behaviors. Given our research focus, we only consider subjects
who opened the promotion emails in our experiment, and track their behaviors one season
following the experiment 7.
First, we calculate the conditional conversion rate under different treatments. The
conditional conversion rate is defined as the proportion of customers who purchased the
product conditional on their opening the emails. Given the availability of the data we
access, two types of conditional conversion rates are calculated: (1) the short term one,
which is directly influenced by the treatments they receive during the campaign period,
when customers could redeem the coupon they received; (2) the long term one, which is
purely influenced by the information they receive in the campaign period but there is no
such coupons available during the subsequent one season following the campaign period.
Table 4.1 shows that the number of subjects opening the emails is consistent
across the treatments but that the conversion rates are not. The table segregates customers
based on when they purchased the product – either during the campaign period or outside.
7

The period following the experiment is not strictly one season give the restrained access to the
data from the company we work with.
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Note that, even if customers had purchased during the campaign period, we do not have
access to information about whether they actually redeemed the coupon or not. For the
rest of the analysis, we assume that any purchase during the campaign involves the
redemption of the coupon. Observe that during the one week campaign, the high coupon
appears to produce the best outcome. A large number of customers took advantage of the
offer to evaluate the product. Amongst the low coupon treatment, the conversion rate is
perhaps the worst. We will evaluate that aspect of the result later. Surprisingly, we find
that the extent to which discounts are offered do not have a monotonic variation with
respect to conversion rates. Following the campaign period, the conversion rates are the
lowest for the high coupon treatment. The total conversion for the entire season is similar
across the information only and low coupon treatments. The main summary is that high
coupons are quite effective during the campaign period. However, the low-coupon may
play a role similar to the information only treatment. Perhaps, it may be the reason why
customers did not buy as much during the campaign period but bought it later.
In other words, in the short term, intuitively, we can see that high coupons are
statistically more effective in converting customers to purchase the product compared to
the other two (one-side t test, p<0.01). Interestingly, the effectiveness of low coupon is
statistically even worse than just sending out information (one side t test, p<0.01).
However, in the long term, surprisingly, low coupon treatment has the highest impact to
convert customers to purchase while high coupon treatment is statistically the worst. In
other words, we found that low coupons are more effective in performing as an
information role in the long term than pure information treatments. However, high
coupons serve more as a role in attracting price sensitive customers in the short term.
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Table 4.1 Performance of Treatments in the Experiment
# of Subjects
opening the
emails

Conditional
conversion rate
during the campaign

High Coupon

70

20.00%

Conditional conversion
rate in 1 season (excluding
conversions during the
campaign)
4.29%

Low Coupon

63

4.76%

7.94%

Information

70

7.14%

5.71%

Secondly, we convert the summary data from Table 4.1 into an influence
proportion matrix 8, which is shown in Table 4.2. The rows in the table represent the
treatments while the columns are the condition under which the converted customers are
influenced to purchase. For example, in the “Low Coupon” row, 4.76% of customers who
opened the email in the campaign period bought the product during the campaign period
while 7.94% eventually purchased the product within a season after the campaign period.
Those 7.94% customers purchased because of the information received but not the low
coupon treatment. As seen in Table 4.2, there are some N/A values, which means there is
no such data for this cell. In the previous example, there is no such data for the high
coupon column under low coupon treatment (row).
Table 4.2 . Influence Proportion Matrix
Information

Low coupon

High coupon

Information

12.86%

N/A*

N/A

Low coupon

7.94%

4.76%

N/A

High coupon

4.29%

N/A

20%

*N/A denotes that there is no such data for this cell as explained in the main text.
8

This table is useful in the sense that it could help our understanding for Figure 4.2 and
Figure 4.3.
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Based on the t test statistics 9, we found that promotions do cause a significant
carryover effect even to the season after the promotion ended, not only to the week after
the promotion expires (Sahni et al. 2014). More specifically, we found that low discount
promotions could cause a higher carryover effect than information only treatments while
high discount promotions could not. That said, in the long run, it makes sense that low
discount promotions are sent out to certain customers than just sending out information
only emails. Even though low coupons may make customers perceive the product on
promotion as low quality, it does provide a long term effect in informing customers and
nudge them to purchase it.

4.4.2

Effects of Treatments on Customer Types

Next we study how well the treatments affect different customer types. For this
analysis, we again restrict the analysis to subjects who opened the emails. The number of
subjects who opened the email was 203, of which 34 converted. Among the converts and
non-converts, we are interested in retracting the characteristics of those customers. We
used a logit regression model to evaluate how well the feature set of the individual
customer predicted their conversion (1 as converts and 0 as non-converts). The feature
set in this logit model also includes the treatment the subject was assigned to.
Interestingly, we find that only the “purchase” variable (i.e. the number of previous
purchases) to be a significant factor. As a next step, we estimated a different logit model
where we interacted “purchase” with treatments. Even though the interaction terms are
not significant, it appears to indicate that high coupons are more effective when
9

The differences across groups are all statistically significant at least 99% confidence level.
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customers has little prior purchasing experience (Refer to Appendix C for details about
the two logit models we run.). This motivates our analysis in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 Average Number of Previous Purchases
Following our previous analysis, we analyzed the number of previous purchases
made by the customer segments.

Figure 4.1 captures both the average number of

purchases made by top 1000 customers identified by SVM (bars with inclined lines) and
the average by the converts (bars with horizontal straight lines). This figure shows that
customers with relatively fewer purchase experience react positively to the high coupon
treatment compared with other treatments.
In the previous analysis, we only focused on the aggregate level analysis with
respect to treatments. Because we would like to analyze the reaction of individual
customers, we also consider the survival analysis. The survival analysis also gives
insights into when the customer would purchase the product without interventions and
how interventions affect the purchasing behaviors. Details about the survival analysis are
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provided in Appendix D. The hazard function is estimated based on customer data at the
end of 2013 using non-parametric methods. They are shown as the blue curves in Figures
4.2 and Figure 4.3, where the horizontal axis “lenfol” represents the number of previous
orders customers have placed. Note that the hazard rate function is right censored because
we do not observe the customer population for duration beyond 2013.

Figure 4.2 Hazard function and customers identified by treatments
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Figure 4.3 Hazard function and customers identified by how they were influenced to
purchase the focal product

Figure 4.2 identifies the purchasing customers based on the treatments that they
were subjected to. Because the coupon had a validity period and not all customers
purchased within the period, we identified customers who purchased subsequent to the
coupon validity as having been affected only because of information. Figure 4.3 simply
accounts for whether information played a role or not. Notice between the figures that a
large number of customers in the low-coupon treatment purchased the product
subsequent to the window. It appears that the figures are consistent with findings in
Figure 4.1 in that high coupons are effective with relatively newer customers. One
possible explanation is that new customers may have significant distractions and
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providing emails with health related messages possibly does not attract attention.
Offering high coupons may gain their attention. On the other hand, for experienced
customers, their purchasing habits are relatively set routines. So, information is sufficient
as a nudge.
4.5

Conclusions and Implications

In this chapter, we analyzed data from a field experiment and investigate if
promotions of different depths play a different role in informing customers in a short term
and long term. We found that promotions do cause a carryover effect even to the season
after the promotion ended, not only to the week after the promotion expires (Sahni et al.
2014). More specifically, we found that low discount promotions could cause a higher
carryover effect than information only treatments while high discount promotions could
not. Furthermore, we find additional managerial insights. We find that customers who are
new to the store are more likely to benefit from high coupons, while relatively older
customers are converted using information. Coupons with a low discount value, however,
are not found as effective as the other two strategies.
Our work has both significant theoretical contributions and industrial implications.
First, our paper enriches the promotion literature on email targeting. Second, the work
extends findings from prior literature on the information role that coupons play both in
the short term and long term. From the perspective of the marketing managers, they could
strategically leverage coupons of different promotion depths and/or information
depending on their objective. For example, high coupons could attract attention of
customers who have a lower willingness-to-pay in the short term but might lower
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customers’ price expectation. Low coupons actually could play an important role in
informing customers in a relatively long term, which is even higher than purely sending
out information. Additionally, we offer insights regarding how to actively nudge using
different strategies for different types of customers.
Although our work convey interesting findings, we admit there are some
limitations. Firstly, our results are only based on one field experiment. It would be
interesting to test our results on more experiments in which different promotion frames
could be used as well. Second, only one product is involved in the experiment. It would
be more insightful to validate this result using different product categories. Besides, given
the limited access to the individual level data in the experiment, we could not conduct
more sophisticated analysis, such as difference in difference approach. If individual level
purchase data is available in future field experiments, it would be interesting to conduct
such analysis and gain more insightful results.
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CHAPTER 5.

CONCLUSIONS

With the increasing availability of information technologies, shaping customers’
behaviors is more easily accomplished given the company’s ability to adapt their
offerings according to customers’ demand as well as track customers’ online behaviors.
In this dissertation, predictive analytics, structural model and field experiments are
employed to analyze vast amount of data to understand customers’ online purchase and
contribution behaviors. Our work makes significant contributions to the information
systems, supply chain, recommender systems, predictive analytics, email marketing and
crowdfunding literatures. The interdisciplinary nature of our research highlights the role
of big data analytics in understanding and nudging customers’ behaviors. Therefore, our
work also generates meaningful insights to business managers.
In Chapter 2, we develop a SVM based approach to identify limited number of
customers to be nudged to purchase products with supply constraints. We evaluate and
compare the proposed approach with other existing techniques via a randomized field
experiment. We find that, in terms of the successful nudges, our SVM-based approach
performed better than other approaches. Our findings generate insights to business
managers on what techniques they can use to identify potential customers to be nudged
and how different nudging strategies could be used to shape customers’ behaviors.
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We are not only focusing on nudging customers to purchase. In Chapter 3, we pay
attention to nudging customers to contribute, specifically, in a reward-based
crowdfunding platform. We develop a structural model to understand backers’ learning
and pledging behaviors. We use it to test a variety of behavioral theories of how PRS and
intertemporal changes in the PRS influence backers’ pledging decisions over the course
of a project’s funding period. Interestingly, estimation results show that reward levels that
have been popular options till date or that have gained recent popularity are perceived to
be more favorable if they are pushed lower down the menu of options, presumably by
introducing weaker or less attractive options ahead of them in the menu. From the
counterfactual analysis, we further show that project creators could strategically add a
reward option above popular rewards in a relatively later time period to make the popular
options even more popular.
In Chapter 4, we further investigate the impact of different nudging strategies,
such as information only, low discount, high discount, on customers’ purchase behaviors.
We evaluate the effectiveness of those different nudging strategies via a randomized field
experiment. Consistently with prior literature, we found coupons could serve as a form of
“advertisement”. Furthermore, our findings provide evidence that coupons with a low
discount value could have a longer information carryover effect than those with a higher
discount one. We also evaluate how well the identified customers are nudged through
information and/or couponing. The experiment shows that customers who are new to the
store are more likely to benefit from high coupons, while relatively older customers are
converted using information. Coupons with a low discount value, however, are not found
as effective as the other two strategies.
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In conclusion, this dissertation leverages state-of-the-art methodologies, such as
predictive analytics and structural modeling, and analyze enormous amount of data to
understand and nudge customers’ purchase and contribution behaviors in two types of
online engagement platforms. We propose methods to identify customers to be nudged,
study impacts of different nudging strategies, and also model customers’ behaviors so
that effective nudging strategies could be provided to business managers. Our work
makes significant contributions to both the theoretical literature and business practice. As
big data analytics become more and more popular, there will be more groundbreaking
studies in this area in the near future.
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Appendix A

Support Vector Machine

In this section, we briefly discuss the main idea of SVM. For details, refer to
Vapnik (2000) and Cui and Curry (2005). SVM classification is also known as
“maximum margin classifier”. The main idea of SVM is to find a separating
hyperplane which “lies midway between the convex hulls of the two groups and be
orthogonal to the shortest line connecting these hulls” (Vapnik 2000).
There are two forms of the objective function: a primal and a dual form:
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑤𝑤 ∗ ∙ 𝑥𝑥 + 𝑤𝑤0∗ = ∑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝑤𝑤0∗ , where 𝑤𝑤 denotes a weight vector, 𝑥𝑥
represents an input feature vector and 𝑤𝑤0 is a constant.

The kernel function is specified as ∅(𝑥𝑥 ∙ 𝑧𝑧) = ∅(𝑥𝑥) ∙ ∅(𝑧𝑧). Given this feature

of the kernel transformation, we can conclude that the solution to the optimization
problem is the same no matter if the problem is solved in the original attribute space
using or in the transformed feature dimension.
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �

1 𝑛𝑛
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − �
𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎 𝑦𝑦 𝑦𝑦 ∅�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 �
2 𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗=1 𝑖𝑖 𝑗𝑗 𝑖𝑖 𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑛𝑛

𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡. �

𝑛𝑛

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 0, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0

𝑖𝑖=1

where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 are Lagrange multipliers in the original optimization problem.

The kernel function we use in our capacity constrained supply chain context is

Gaussian (radial basis) kernel.
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Appendix B

Examples of Analysis in Section 2.5

Take training period 10 (April, 2011 to June, 2011) as an example. We use
customers’ purchase data in period 11 to period 20 to evaluate the number of
successful predictions from period 10. Figure B.1 shows the cumulative number of
success over the multiple subsequent time periods. We could see that if we use longer
time window to observe the targeted customers, some of them do convert to purchase
in later time periods in a self-discovery manner. 15% of the predictions convert to
purchase among the top 1000 ranked customers from period 10.

Figure B.1 Accumulative Number of Success in Lifetime Prediction (Period
10)

Again take the training period 10 as an example. We use the subsequent 10
periods as the test window, and track the purchase patterns of those top 1000
customers. Figure B.2 conveys that if we extend the time window to lifetime and

94
track the repeat purchases behaviors of those converted customers, we could find that
those converted customers do purchase this product repeatedly. On average every
converted customers come back to purchase 4.2 times.

Figure B.2 Number of Repeat Purchases of Converted Customers in Lifetime
(Period 10)
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Appendix C

Analysis Using the Experiment Data

Conditional on customers opening the emails, we investigate how customers
behave to convert to purchase or not purchase. We use converts/non-converts (1/0) as
response variable in the logit regression model. We use features of those customers
and treatments (dummy variables) as predictor variables. We conducted several
additional analysis to understand what types of customers are more prone to convert
under different treatments. We have the following findings.
First, as shown in Table C.1, we put all the predictor variables in the logit
regression and found only the purchase experience i.c. the number of previous orders
has a significant impact on the conversion odd (p<0.01).
Table C.1 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Model 1
Standard
Parameter

DF Estimate

Wald

Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq

Intercept

1

-3.9352

0.7549

27.1747

<.0001

highDummy

1

0.6704

0.5109

1.7216

0.1895

lowDummy

1

-0.0903

0.5743

0.0248

0.8750

Beef

1

0.6444

0.6655

0.9377

0.3329

Pork

1

0.7777

0.6435

1.4607

0.2268

otherRedMeat

1

0.7288

0.7384

0.9743

0.3236

poultry

1

0.6667

0.6363

1.0978

0.2948

seafood

1

0.5952

0.6508

0.8364

0.3604

otherMeat

1

1.0460

1.2875

0.6601

0.4165
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Table C.1 continued
diary

1

0.5287

0.6278

0.7090

0.3998

notMeat

1

0.3334

0.6173

0.2918

0.5891

organic

1

-0.1363

0.2126

0.4109

0.5215

nonOrg

1

-0.0809

0.2235

0.1311

0.7173

grassfed

1

-0.4590

0.6769

0.4599

0.4977

nonGrass

1

0.6273

1.3108

0.2290

0.6323

price

1

0.00811

0.00439

3.4158

0.0646

purchase

1

0.6170*

0.1922

10.3071

0.0013

*parameter significant at at least 99% confidence level

Secondly, another logit regression model with interaction term between
number of previous orders, which is significant, and treatments is analyzed to study
how this effect would change with respect to different treatments. Results are shown
in Table C.2. Even though the interaction effects are not significant, the model with
interaction terms does provide a better goodness of fit and indicate customers’
different responses to the treatments. (The direction of impact of high coupon/low
coupon is also consistent with our findings in Figure 4.2). This in fact motivates us to
analyze the hazard ratio along the number of previous purchases and plot Figure 4.2
and Figure 4.3.
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Table C.2 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Model 2
Standard
Parameter

DF Estimate

Wald

Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq

Intercept

1

-2.8870

0.7183

16.1527

<.0001

highDummy

1

1.3611

0.8748

2.4210

0.1197

lowDummy

1

-0.9704

1.1627

0.6966

0.4039

purchase

1

0.1710*

0.0941

3.3005

0.0693

highDummy*purchase

1

-0.0946

0.1220

0.6013

0.4381

lowDummy*purchase

1

0.1748

0.1532

1.3028

0.2537

*parameter significant at at least 90% confidence level
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Appendix D

Survival Analysis

The primary focus of survival analysis is to model the hazard rate,ℎ(𝑡𝑡), which
describes the instantaneous rate of an event occurring at time t. The event in our
context is defined as customers’ discovering and purchasing the focal product, which
is grass-fed beef. The mortality of a customer is assumed to occur as soon as the
customer purchases the grass-fed beef. The number of purchases between a
customer’s first purchase in this store and his first purchase of the grass-fed beef
product is the longevity of the customer in our dataset. Note that the longevity in our
dataset is right-censored, because we have purchase history information only until
2013.
The “hazard” function, ℎ(𝑡𝑡), which describes the probability of the event

occurring at time t �f(t)�, conditional on the subject's survival up to that time t (S(t)),
𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)

is ℎ(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑆𝑆(𝑡𝑡). Kernel-smoothed estimators of the hazard function h(t) are based on

the Nelson-Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard function 𝐻𝐻�(𝑡𝑡). Details on using
individual level data for estimating ℎ(𝑡𝑡) could be found at SAS (2010). The Nelson-

Aalen estimator of the cumulative hazard function is a non-parametric estimator and
is given by

� (𝑡𝑡) = ∑𝑡𝑡 ≤𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 ,
𝐻𝐻
𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖

where di is the number of customers who discover and

purchase the product out of ni potential customers in interval t i .The estimator is
calculated, then, by summing the proportion of those potential customers who

discovered and purchased the product in each interval up to time t. The estimated
hazard function is shown as the solid line in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3.

Appendix E A Sample of Reward Description Categorization
Table E.1

A Sample of Reward Description Categorization
Backer
Other or

Tickets
Contributor

Reward

Decorativ

In-Kind

Product

for early

Reward description

Acknowledge
e Item

level

Item

Engageme
Gratitude

Unique
nt in

Samples

access to
ment

Reward
Product
Types

product
creation

The Appreciator: A
"Special Thanks" shout
out on our Facebook Page
25

for being a valued

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

supporter of these great
men and what they are
doing.
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The Good Deed:A Special
Thanks on the official
"Cycle of Life" Facebook
50

Page and 2 "Cycle of Life"

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

custom engraved
"Livestrong" style
bracelets.
The Supporter: Everything
listed in the above
donation categories plus
an Official "Cycle of Life"
100

T-Shirt and an additional 2
"Cycle of Life" bracelets.
A special thanks in the
credits and a DVD copy of
the completed

100

documentary.

The Activist: A Total of
10 "Cycle of Life"
Bracelets. 2 T-Shirts ，1
Dry-fit custom Designed
250

exercise shirt ，a "special

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

thanks" in the credits ，as
well as a digital copy of
the project upon
completion.
The Producer: You will
receive all of the above
500

listed rewards as well as a
co-producer credit in the
completed documentary.

101

The Executive: All of the
rewards listed above
except you will be
1000

0

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

acknowledged as a
Producer in the credits of
the documentary.
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